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NOTES
TO INSURE OR NOT TO INSURE, THAT IS THE
QUESTION: CONGRESS' ATTEMPT TO
BOLSTER THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY AFTER
THE ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001.
MARK BORAN*
INTRODUCTION
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt predicted that December
7, 1941 would be a date that lived in infamy.' He was correct,
* J.D. Candidate, June 2003, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., cum laude, City
University of New York - Queens College. The author wishes to dedicate his note to the
memory of his parents, Richard & Jeanne Boran.
1 See President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address before Congress (Dec. 8, 1941)
available at http://odur.let.rug.nl/-usa/P/fr32/speeches/ph.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2003)
("Yesterday, Dec. 7, 1941 - a date which will live in infamy - the United States of
America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of
Japan"); see also Japan and the Past it Denies, Cmi. TRIB., July 14, 2001, at 25 (quoting
Roosevelt's speech and claiming that "it changed the course of history");
http://www.pearlharborattacked.com (last visited Apr. 13, 2003) (discussing the
President's speech to Congress and the subsequent declaration of war by the United
States).
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ask people alive at the time and they remember it vividly. 2 They
recall where they were and the accompanying feelings coursing
through the country. 3 This generation has experienced a similar
if not more devastating event in the criminal acts perpetrated on
September 11, 2001.4 On that day, members of the A1-Queda
terrorist network, bankrolled by Osama bin Laden, hijacked four
commercial airliners. 5 They flew three of the aircraft into,
arguably, the most symbolic structures in America: the Pentagon
in Washington, D.C.; and the World Trade Center's (WTC) Twin
Towers in New York City.6
Forever seared into minds is the sight of planes being flown
into the Twin Towers. 7 Millions watched helplessly as the media
2 See Survivors Remember Pearl Harbor, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Dec. 7, 1986, Domestic
Section (describing Pearl Harbor memorial ceremony); Arnold Garcia, Central Texas
Remembers Attack on Pearl Harbor Sharing Memories, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Dec. 7,
1998, at A10 (portraying people's recollections of Pearl Harbor attack);
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/pearlharborintro.html (last visited Apr. 13,
2003) [hereinafter ABC News] (stating that the phrase "day that will live in infamy"
brought home to Americans that they were not immune from attack).
3 See Mark Potash, Memories ofPearl Harbor, CHIC. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 7, 1997, at 38
(depicting deepness of emotions associated with the attack on Pearl Harbor). See
generally http://www.pearlharborattacked.com (last visited Apr. 13, 2003) (providing
message board for people wishing to share Pearl Harbor experiences);
http://soundportraits.org/on-air/the-day-after.-pearl harbor/transcript.php3 (last visited
Apr. 13, 2003) (containing transcripts of peoples' reactions to Pearl Harbor attack).
4 See Dec. 7, 1941, and 9/11: Dawns of New Eras in US. History, USA TODAY, Dec.
06, 2002, at A22 (illustrating devastation of the attacks); see also ABC News, supra note 2
(positing similarities between events of December 7, 1941 and September 11, 2001); What
Does It All Mean?, SALON.COM NEWS at http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2001/09/
ll/reacts/print.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2003) (detailing journalists' reactions to the
Trade Center attack and describing New York City as a "war zone" and the United States
as a country "at war").
5 See Riveting 'Cell' Exposes Flaws in the Fight Against al Qaeda, BOSTON GLOBE,
Sept. 4, 2002, at D5 (suggesting connection between Al Qaeda terrorist network and
September 11 attacks); US. Attacked, SALON.COM NEWS at
http://www.salon.comlnews/feature/20OVl09/llbombings/print.html (last visited Apr. 13,
2003) (quoting CNN report that people associated with Osama bin Laden "may have been
responsible" for September 11th attacks). See generally Man of the Hour, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, Sept. 23, 2002, at 16 (discussing the FBI's arrest of the alleged
coordinator of September 11th attacks).
6 See Howard Kurtz, Interview Sheds Light On Bin Laden's Views, WASH. POST, Feb.
7, 2002, at A12 (quoting bin Laden speaking of the structures as "awesome symbolic
towers that speak of liberty, human rights and humanity"); see also Johan Galtung &
Dietrich Fischer, Without Understanding, the Vicious Cycle of Violence Will Continue,
NAT'L CATH. REP., Sept. 20, 2002, at 23 (acknowledging symbolic nature of terrorist
attacks); US. Attacked, SALON.COM NEWS at http://www.salon.com/news/
feature/2001/09/11/bombings/print.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2003) (reporting that "[tiwo
hijacked airliners crashed into each of the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center,
another hijacked jetliner crashed into the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, just outside
the nation's capital, and yet another hijacked aircraft crashed in Pennsylvania.").
7 See Rachel Searles, The Mental Aftermath, NORTH GATE NEWS, Oct. 11, 2001 at
http://journalism.journalism.berkeley.edu/ngno/issues/911/101101searles.html (last
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replayed the attack and the ensuing collapse of the structuresS
that symbolized America's economic preeminence. 9  Shock,
disbelief, and despair gripped the nation'O as many worried about
the safety of friends and loved ones who either worked or lived in
the New York metropolitan area.11 As the days after the attack
dragged on, the focus shifted to those trapped in the rubble that
once was the financial center of the nation if not the world.' 2
Later, the shock and the disbelief were somewhat displaced by
the search for those responsible. 13
visited Apr. 13, 2003) (quoting mental health counselor regarding negative effects of
"watching these indelible images over and over again on TV"); see also Kelly Patricia
O'Meara, The Grief Police, INSIGHT ON NEWS, Jan. 28, 2002, at 10 (discussing the range of
emotional reactions to the attacks); Carol Richards, Still Feeling Vulnerable? You're Not
Alone, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Jan 13, 2002, at B08 (illustrating the psychological effects of the
attacks).
8 See Searles, supra note 7 (describing the psychological impact of viewing images of
the attack); 9/11 One Year Later, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Sept. 8, 2002, at D47 (describing the
shocked reactions of people as they watched the September 11th attacks on television);
see also Laura Berman, One Tragic Day Forever Shatters Our Safe and Secure World,
DETROIT NEWS, Sept. 12, 2001, at 20A (illustrating the magnitude of the event as
portrayed on television).
9 See Terry McDermott & Tim Rutten, Icons of the American Dream Crash Down:
World Trade Center: Towers Held Thousands of People and Stood for the Height of
Freedom, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2001, at S3 (stating that "The towers were the symbols
upon which the preeminence of the American economy was built."); see also Editorial,
America Attacked, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 11, 2001, at A22, (positing that the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon were attacked precisely because they were the symbols of
America's military and financial power); Muslim Anger Toward US. Intensiies in Post-
9/11 Era, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 13, 2002, at 16 (portraying the terrorists' targets as "symbols of
American economic and military might").
10 See US. Attacked, SALON.COM NEWS at http://www.salon.com/news/feature/
2001/09/ll/bombings/print.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2003) (reporting that the "nation
reacted with shock and horror"); see also What Does It All Mean?, SALON.COM NEWS at
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2001/09/11/reacts/print.html (last visited Apr. 13,
2003) (describing the emotional stages felt after catastrophes); Merri Rosenberg, Religion:
Private Crises of Conscience, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2001, § 14WC, at 5 (describing the
range of reactions to the attack).
11 See Antonio Olivo, One Twin Sister is Missing, the Other Anxiously Waits for
News, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Sept 12, 2001 (describing the tension and worry as people
searched for their friends and loved ones); Lisa Priest, Aftermath: The Rescue Efforts,
GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Sept. 15, 2001 (describing people searching for missing persons
after attacks); Dionne Searcey, Terrorist Attacks: A Quiet Wait by Two Friends' Families,
NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Sept. 15, 2001, at W23 (explaining the tension of uncertainty as people
waited for news regarding their family members).
12 See Dan Barry, Rescuers Dig Through the Rubble: Few Found Alive, Hopes Fade
Amid Careful Digging, PITTS. POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 13, 2001, at A7 (describing the body
retrieval efforts at "ground zero"); Ed Hayward, Hundreds Volunteer for Grim Job: New
Yorkers Cope with Fragmented Lives, BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 14, 2001, at 6 (reporting
how hundreds of people left their jobs to aid in the rescue effort); see also Charity Vogel,
Amid Grim Hours, a Jubilant Moment, BUFFALO NEWS, Sept. 14, 2001, at A7 (describing
the grim results of the rescuers).
1 See Charles M. Sennott, Attack on America: The Suspects, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept
12, at A8 (explaining that United States had narrowed its search to Osama bin Laden);
Peg Tyre, What Next" While Rescuers Search for Survivors, Law Enforcement Agencies
2003
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The ramifications upon the insurance industry did not enter
the thoughts of the nation and the world, 14 and well it should not
have during those first days and weeks following the tragedy.
Eventually however, the insurance aspects arose and the country
could rest assured that all was well - the losses would be
covered. 15 The insurance industry would honor existing policies.
Initially, worries arose because of the possibility that the
insurance companies would utilize exclusions in all policies that
disallowed recovery for losses caused by acts of war. 16 The
industry went to great lengths to calm the nation's worries by
unequivocally stating that it would stand behind all policies
written.17 The industry would not reach for the war exclusions to
avoid paying the exorbitant costs incurred by the attack.18
are Gathering Their Forces to Hunt Down the Culprits, Sept. 11, 2001, NEWSWEEK WEB
EXCLUSIVE, available at 2001 WL 24138866 (describing investigators' efforts to find out
who was responsible for the attack); see also David Morris, Bush Prays for Victims, Says
U.S. Must "Rid the World of Evil' BLOOMBERG NEWS, Sept. 14, 2001 (discussing President
Bush's proposition of war against those responsible for the attack).
14 See Business Insurance Claims Consultant for World Trade Center Coverage,
INTERNET WIRE, Sept. 25, 2001, available at 2001 WL 23403955 (stating that the change
in emphasis from rescue to recovery brought focus onto the insurance industry). But c£
David Ress, Disaster Will Cost Insurers 'Billions and Billions, STAR-LEDGER (Newark,
N.J.), Sept. 12, 2001, at 22 (noting that the insurance industry will suffer a tremendous
financial drain due to attacks); Floyd Norris and Jonathan Fuerbringer, A Day of Terror:
The Markets, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at C1 (describing a decline in insurance
company stock because of investors' expectation of large claims).
S See Finance: Insurance Group Says No Assistance Needed For Now, CONGRESS
DAILY AM, Sept. 19, 2001, available at 2001 WL 27552264 (stating that no insurance
company was looking to utilize exclusions in order to avoid coverage); see also Armond D.
Budish, Tragedy Survivors To Test Insurance, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 28, 2001, at 2F
(noting insurance companies' intention not to deny benefits under the act-of-war
exclusion); Kathleen Pender, Good Time To Update Insurance, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 21,
2001, at El (reporting "insurance companies are expected to pay all claims related to the
disaster").
16 See Arthur M. Louis, Most Big Insurance To Pay Claims; Some May Invoke Act-of-
War Clauses in Their Policies, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 18, 2001, at C1 (stating "several
insurance companies have indicated they may invoke the act of war clause"); James
Moore, How Lloyd's is Coping with the World's Biggest Claim, TIMES (London), Sept. 29,
2001 (noting difficulty in predicting whether or how war exclusions would be applied). But
see Finance: Insurance Group Says No Assistance Needed For Now, supra note 15
(stating that no insurance company planned to invoke the act-of-war exclusion to deny
coverage).
17 See Chet Bridger, Workers' Comp to be Hit With Attack-Related Claims: High Cost
of Premiums Expected to Increase for Businesses in New York State, BUFFALO NEWS,
Sept. 19, 2001, at B4 (reporting that insurance companies immediately claimed they
would not consider invoking coverage escape clauses); Budish, supra note 15 (stating
insurance companies did not intend to deny coverage under the war exclusion); Robert E.
Vagley, Unprecedented Risk, DAILY DEAL, Nov. 8, 2001, at www.TheDeal.com (stating
that the insurance industry did not attempt to shirk the responsibilities it owed to its
insureds).
18 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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The industry has estimated its losses at between $35 billion
and $70 billion dollars.19 This projection will increase as time
marches on and intangible losses become known.20 The upper
level is likely to move higher as business interruption 2' losses are
determined.22
The insurance industry is a healthy and robust industry.23 It
has assets valued in excess of $3 trillion dollars. 24 The industry is
fully capable of handling the losses incurred due to the
19 See US Securities and Insurance Industries: Keeping the Promise, Hearing of the
House Fin. Serv. Comm., 107th Cong. 11 (2001) [hereinafter Hearingl (Rep. Paul E.
Kanjorski (R-PA) stating that the range of loss was estimated to be between $20 billion
and $70 billion); see also David Pilla, WTC Loss Estimates Drop on Clearer Claims
Information, BESTWIRE, Jan. 17, 2002 (stating that New York State's Insurance
Commissioner estimated losses would total $35 billion); Joseph B. Treaster & Milt
Freudenheim, A Nation Challenged: The Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2001, at C4
(noting "total insurance claims are expected to be as high as $40 billion").
20 See Pilla, supra note 19 (stating that "miscellaneous liability claims" could reach
$10 billion); see also Jeff Harrington, Insurers Tally Magnitude and Number of Claims,
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, at 1E (noting "it may take years to determine final
cost to insurance"); Joseph B. Teaster, After Providing Lift To City Economy, Insurance
Payments for 9/11 Losses Slow Down, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2002, at B7 (commenting that
losses may take years to be fully known).
21 See generally Hazel Glenn Beh, Physical Losses in Cyberspace, 8 CONN. INS. L.J.
55, 67 (2001) (commenting that "traditional business interruption coverage requires that
the insureds suffer a 'distinct suspension of operations,' not merely a lesser event such as
a slowdown or a smaller disruption of operations"); William M. Shernoff & Douglas M.
Carasso, Insuring Businesses Interrupted By Terrorist Acts, 226 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 24, 2001,
at 1 (stating "[blusiness interruption coverage is designed to protect a company's future
and continued earnings when it is unable to pursue normal operations because of physical
loss or damage to the company's real or personal property."); David Pilla, Business
Interruption to Corner 25% of Sept. 11 Claims, BESTWIRE, Feb. 20, 2002 (noting that
premiums for business interruption coverage have risen 30% to 200% due to large losses).
22 See Shernoff & Carasso, supra note 21, at 1 (stating that courts must determine
whether businesses not in the World Trade Center area but which suffered business
losses due to attack are covered under business interruption policies); see also Pilla, supra
note 21 (commenting that business interruption claims are the most difficult to assess);
Teaster, supra note 20, at B7 (noting that a certain amount of estimating and subjectivity
is required in determining business interruption losses because such coverage is
calculated based upon lost income).
23 See Hearing, supra note 19, at 11 (Rep. Paul E. Kanjorski (R-PA) describing the
insurance marketplace as "large and dynamic"); Stephen Labaton & Joseph Treaster, A
Nation Challenged: The Subsidies, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2001, at B1 (reporting that the
insurance industry is a relatively healthy industry); Stuart Silverstein, After the Attack:
Markets, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2001, at 3 (noting that "big insurers are considered
financially healthy enough to absorb the cost of pending claims without suffering severe
blows").
24 See Hearing, supra note 19, at 61 (quoting a release from the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners stating that the industry "is an $850 billion industry with
assets of over $3 trillion"); see also Christine Dugas & Julie Appleby, Industry Can Bear
Burden, USA TODAY, Sept. 14, 2001, at 4B (reporting "U.S. insurance industry has assets
of $3 trillion"); Jackie Spinner, Life Insurers Want Study of Future Terrorism's Cost,
WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 2001, at A9 (noting "life insurance industry has $3.2 trillion in
assets").
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destruction of the World Trade Center.2 5 It may very well be able
to withstand several such attacks.26 However, the industry has
finite resources27 and the damages caused by such terrorist
attacks are infinite. 28 As such, the losses involved have caused
reinsurance companies to refuse to write policies that would
cover losses due to terrorist acts.2 9 The reinsurance companies
are those to whom the primary insurance carriers go to in order
to insure their policies and thereby spread the risk of the few
with the many.30
The vast majority of reinsurance agreements come due every
25 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
26 See Dugas & Appleby, supra note 24, at 4B (noting "industry is sufficiently
capitalized to handle the losses while continuing to fund its growth"); see also US Attack
Will not Cripple The Insurance Industry, INS. DAY, Sept. 18, 2001, at 3 (reporting that the
"insurance industry is strongly capitalized and can withstand an enormous financial hit
without threat to the stability of the system overall"). But see Hearing, supra note 19, at
65 (Kathleen Sebelius, Commissioner, Kansas Department of Insurance, stating that
"industry cannot withstand multiple events in short period of time").
27 See James Flanigan, Placing a High Premium on Fear, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2002,
at 1 (explaining that the recent terrorist attacks toppled both the Twin Towers and the
insurance industry); Tom Hamburger & Christopher Oster, Insurance Industry Backs
US Terrorism Fund, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2001, at A3 (stating that the insurance
industry's capital could not last prolonged terrorist attacks). See generally Steve Jordan,
Official: Insurers Can't Cover a Second Attack, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Sept. 26, 2002, at
ld (discussing the huge impact the terrorist attack of September llth had on the
insurance industry).
28 See Insuring Terrorism Risks: Panel III of Hearing Before Sen. Commerce, Science
& Transp. Comm., 107th Cong., PP (2001) [hereinafter Panel III Hearing (Robert Vagley
testifying that the insurance industry's "financial capacity is limited" while "potential
harm" from terror is "unpredictable in frequency and almost infinite in severity"); see also
John Mueller, False Alarms, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2002, at B07 (noting that the damage
from the attacks on September 11th were "off the charts"); Christian Murray, Business
Lauds Insurance Bill. Terror Aid Seen as Economic Boost, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Nov. 27,
2002, at A27 (estimating the cost of the September 11th attacks at $40 billion).
29 See Hearing, supra note 19, at PP (Dean O'Hare, Chairman & CEO Chubb Corp.,
stating that his insurance firm could not obtain reinsurance for terrorism coverage for
property in New York City); see also Jackie Spinner, Putting a Price on 'What Ifs.'"
Actuaries Lack Figures to Fix Premiums for Terrorism Insurance, WASH. POST, Oct. 24,
2001, at E01 (noting that many insurance companies will stop providing terrorism
coverage as of Jan. 1, 2003); Jackie Spinner, Senate Gets Ready to Debate Terrorism
Insurance Measure, WASH. POST, June 13, 2002, at E03 (stating that reinsurers will stop
providing back-up terrorism coverage to insurance companies).
30 See Premium Rates - Reinsurers Are Taking on Less Risk, at a Higher Price,
ECONOMIST, Feb. 9, 2002, available at 2002 WL 7245119 (stating that reinsursers insure
insurers and that they face stiffer competition when the insurance market hardens and
rates rise); E. Scott Reckard, A Year After Insurance Prices, Restrictions Are Up
Coverage: The Industry's Response to Terrorism Has Led to 30% Rate Increases for
Commercial Properties, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2002, at 1 (noting that reinsurers also
dropped terrorism coverage for the insurance companies they insure); Jackie Spinner,
Terrorism Insurance Still Rare: Industry Waits for Congress to Back Coverage for
Attacks, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 2002, at E03 (explaining that reinsurers, who provide
back up insurance for insurance companies, also suffered huge losses following the
September llth attacks).
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January 1 and approximately 70% of all reinsurance treaties are
up for renewal at the New Year. 31 The reinsurers are using this
as the time to write in exclusions for terrorism that were not seen
before in the United States.32 Before September 11, terrorism
was included in each policy33 while war damages were regularly
excluded. 34 Now it appears that the terrorism exclusion will join
the war damages exclusion as standard, boilerplate language in
every reinsurance treaty.35 True, there is and will continue to be
some private insurers willing to write a policy inclusive of
terror;36 however, the cost will be astronomical as actuaries
31 See Panel III Hearing, supra note 28, at PP (explaining that most reinsurance
agreements are due for renewal at the 1st of the year); see also Congress Needs to Act
Fast to Avert Insurance Crisis, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Dec. 5, 2001, at A40 (stating that "70% of
reinsurance contracts expire at month's end and reinsurers are threatening not to
renew."); Jackie Spinner, Senate Gets Ready to Debate Terrrism Insurance Measure,
WASH. POST, June 13, 2002, at E03 (noting that as of January 1st of this year, most
reinsurers stopped providing terrorism coverage to insurance companies).
32 See Legal Review: US. Courts Set Precedent, REINSURANCE MAG., Dec. 20, 2001,
at 17 (stating that reinsurers plan to raise premiums and to exclude terrorism coverage);
Scott E. Harrington, Insuring Against Terror, NRO FIN., Nov. 5, 2001, at
www.nationalreview.com/nrofcomment/comment-millerprintl10501.html (last visited
Apr. 13, 2003) (stating that reinsurers are refusing to offer terror coverage when contract
renewal time arrives). But see Industry Welcomes Terror Bill Approval, INS. DAY, Nov.
18, 2002 (claiming that the proposed terrorism legislation will help insurance companies
write policies for all risks, including catastrophic ones).
33 See Hearing on Insurance and Terrorism Before Subcomm. On Capital Mkts, Ins.
and Gov't Sponsored Enterof House Fin. Serv. Comm., 107th Cong., PP (2001)
(hereinafter Hillman testimony] (noting the statements of Richard Hillman, Director,
Financial Markets and Community Investment); see also Jonathan Riskind, House OKs
Terror Insurance Bill, COLUMBUS DiSP., Nov. 30, 2001, at 01F (explaining that although
most policies do not exclude terrorism from their coverage, they do not specifically include
such coverage either); Jackie Spinner, Senate Gets Ready to Debate Terrorism Insurance
Measure, WASH. POST, June 13, 2002, at E03 (noting that most insurance policies
included terrorism coverage prior to September 11, 2001).
34 See Pender, supra note 15, at El (explaining that most policies exclude from
coverage any damage resulting from an act of war); David Ress, Policies Should Pay Out
Claims for Terrorism - Legal Experts Don't See Insurance Loopholes, STAR-LEDGER
(Newark, N.J.), Sept. 15, 2001, at 10 (positing that damages incurred due to the terrorist
attacks would not lie within the standard war exclusions). See generally Dee DePass,
Insurer Expects to Pay $700 Million: About 29 of Total Caused by Attacks, STAR TRIB.,
Sept. 20, 2001, at 3D (announcing that most insurance companies will not invoke the "act-
of-war" language in their policies in order to exclude September l1th- related losses from
coverage).
35 See Best Insurance Policy: Backup Fund Like State, PALM BEACH POST, Oct. 28,
2001, at 2E (explaining that the terrorism exclusion clause will become a standard
provision in most insurance contracts). But see Christine Dugas, House OKs Bill on
Terror Insurance, USA TODAY, Nov. 15, 2002, at 1B (commenting that terrorism coverage,
in its present form, is either unavailable or unaffordable for most commercial property
holders); Christian Murray, Weak Foundation: Lack of Insurance Against Terrorism
Hinders Existing Commercial Buildings and Future Construction, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Sept.
16, 2002, at A27 (noting that because of the attacks of September 11, most insurers have
dropped terrorism coverage from their "all-risk" policies).
36 See AON Unveils Its Terrorism and Sabotage Solution, INS. DAY, Oct. 31, 2001
2003
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attempt to configure some method to determine the correct
premium for such coverage. 37
This note will outline the basic premises of insurance law as it
pertains to the area of the industry known as reinsurance. Part I
will define and lay out the primary definitions and aspects of the
reinsurance area. Part II will be split into two subparts: that
dealing with the United States Federal Government acting as
insurer or reinsurer and dealing with foreign jurisdictions that
have chosen to have the government enter the reinsurance arena
to allow the continued vitality of the economy due to the
industry's refusal to underwrite policies that would cover loss
due to terror. Part III will outline plans presented to Congress
by various legislators and industry representatives that place the
Federal Government in the position as the insurer of last resort.
Part IV will look at the bills in the House of Representatives and
the Senate, respectively.
BASIC INSURANCE LAW
Man's search to reduce risk has occurred since time
immemorial. 38 The foremost reason behind attempts to reduce
risk is the maximization of profit.39 Because of this attempt to
available at LEXIS, News Library (describing the establishment of a risk-management
committee on terrorism and sabotage designed to produce better products for their AON
clients); see also Pool Re and Lloyd's Rivals will Continue to Operate Side-by-Side, INS.
DAY, May 8, 2001, at 10 (stating that alternatives to Pool Reinsurance Company exist in
the terror coverage market). But see Tom Bawden & Chaitali Chakravarty, Need to
Know: The Essential Daily Guide to the Sectors, TIMES (London), Jan. 4, 2003, at 55
(noting that British homeowners will be without coverage for chemical, biological and
nuclear attacks by the end of 2003 because British insurance carriers are writing policies
that exclude terrorism coverage).
37 See Need for Federal Terrorism Insurance Assistance: Terrorism Insurance Rising
Uninsured Exposure to Attacks Heightens Potential Economic Vulnerabilities: Hearing
on HR. 3210 Before House Subcomm. on Oversight Investigations, Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
107th Cong., PP (2002) (Richard Hillman testimony, Director, Financial. Markets and
Commodity Investment, describing the need for federal terrorism insurance assistance);
Landmark Decision, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 2002, at B08 (stating that actuaries do not
know how to calculate the premiums on insurance policies in order to include terrorism
coverage); see also Spinner, supra note 29, at E01 (discussing the problems arising from
calculating terrorism attacks into premiums for insurance coverage).
38 See LEE R. Russ, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 1:1 (3d ed. 1984) (noting that the
institute of insurance is old in comparison to other fields of law); History of Insurance,
FactMonster.com, at http://www.factmonster.com/ce6/bus/A0825301.html (last visited
Apr. 13, 2003) (stating that insurance roots could be traceable to Babylonia). See
generally Insurance: History of Insurance, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, at
http://www.encyclopedia.com (last visited Apr. 13, 2003) (discussing the origin of
insurance and its development).
39 See History of Insurance, supra note 38 (detailing the practices that enabled
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maximize profit, insurance has infused itself throughout
mankind's economies, ancient and modern.40 Insurance has been
defined as a "contract by which one party promises to make a
certain payment of money upon the destruction or injury of
something in which one party has an interest."41
The contract for insurance is necessarily between two parties,
the insured and the insurer, with the insurer being the person
with the property or life in being that is covered by the policy. 42
The ingredient that differentiates the insurance contract from
other contracts is the agreement of the insurer to "assume the
risk of loss and to indemnify the insured for such loss when and
if it occurs."43 For the insurer's promise to reimburse the insured
for losses incurred under the policy, the insured pays the insurer
premiums; whether these premiums are paid on an annual, semi-
annual, or other basis is determined by the contract itself. 44
The primary insurer will often seek to reduce its risk by
purchasing insurance of its own;45 referred to as reinsurance.
merchants to guarantee that their goods reached specified destination without incurring
financial devastation); Insurance: Reasons for Insurance, ENCARTA, at
http://encarta.msn.com (last visited Apr. 13, 2003) (discussing the primary reason behind
insurance - reduction of risk amongst a group). See generally Insurance,
FACTMONSTER.COM, at http://www.factmonster.com/ce6/bus/A0825301.html (last visited
Apr. 13, 2002) (positing that "essence of insurance contract is mutuality" whereby risk of
loss is shared).
40 See ERIC MILLS HOLMES & MARK S. RHODES, HOLMES' APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE
LAW AND PRACTICE § 1:1 (2d ed. 2001) (arguing insurance is fundamental aspect of
society); see also Willy E. Rice, Federal Courts and the Regulation of the Insurance
Industry. An Empirical and Historical Analysis of Courts' Ineffectual Attempts to
Harmonize Federal Antirust, Arbitration, and Insolvency Statutes with the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, 43 CATH. U.L. REV. 399, 400-01 (1994) (analyzing the Court's treatment of
insurance industry); Russ, supra note 38, at § 1:1 (noting the extensive history of
insurance industry).
41 GEORGE J. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE, § 1:2 (2d ed. 1984).
42 See id. (stating "[iun fire and in marine insurance the thing insured is the property;
in life or accident insurance it is the life or health of the person."); see also Group Life &
Health Ins. Co., v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 211 (1979) (describing the elements of an
insurance contract); Eugene R. Anderson et al., Draconian Forfeitures of Insurance:
Commonplace, Indefensible, and Unnecessary, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 825, 828 (1996)
(stating that the public views an insurance contract as property and not as a typical
contract).
43 COUCH, supra note 41, at §1:3.
44 See COUCH, supra note 41, at § 1:22 (stating insurance companies will accept risks
in exchange for premium payments); see also Robert C. Feightner, State Regulation of
Capitated Reimbursement for Physician-Hospital Organizations, 7 HEALTH MATRIX 301,
312 (1997) (observing payment of a premium is necessary component of an insurance
contract); Kenneth E. Spahn, Service Warranty Associations: Regulating Service
Contracts as "Insurance" Under Florida's Chapter 634, 25 STETSON L. REV. 597, 608
(1996) (noting premium paid is a necessary element of an insurance contract).
45 See RuSS, supra note 38, at § 9:1 (explaining that reinsurance protects the insurer
by allowing the insurer to effectively spread the risk it has assumed); see also Richard C.
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Reinsurance is defined as the "ceding by one insurance company
to another of all or a portion of its risks for a stipulated portion of
the premium, in which the liability of the reinsurer is solely to
the reinsured, which is the ceding company, and in which
contract the ceding company retains all contact with the original
insured, [and] handles all matters prior to and subsequent to
loss."46 Such insurance is necessary as a primary insurer cannot
expose itself to the entire amount of risk for an insured and
continue to underwrite policies for others;47 to do so would expose
the insurer to a level of risk that could cause the company to
become insolvent. 48
The insurer will use actuarial tables to ascertain the level of
risk that is concurrent with the premium charged to the
insured.4 9 These tables are based upon the frequency of insured
losses and the concomitant amount of such losses. 50 For example,
tropical storms are determined to be worth a certain premium
Morais, Not So Risky Business Lloyd's Of London Is Having Its Problems, FORBES, Aug.
5, 1991, at 76 (explaining that insuring insurance companies is the business of
reinsurance); Charles F. Corcoran, III, Reinsurance Litigation: A Primer, 16 W. NEW ENG.
L. REV. 41, 41 (1994) (positing "[a] reinsurer is an insurance company's insurer").
46 JOHN APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE, pt. 54, ch. 278
§7681 (1976).
47 See Russ, supra note 38, at § 9:1 (stating the alternative to reinsurance is for
insurers to stop writing certain policies); Corcoran v. Universal Reinsurance Corp., 713
F.Supp 77, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (noting that insurance companies depend upon reinsurance
for their ability to fulfill their obligations under their policies); Steven W. Thomas, Utmost
Good Faith in Reinsurance: A Tradition In Need ofAdjustment, 41 DUKE L.J. 1548, 1548
(1992) (stating reinsurance was created "to spread the risk of loss").
48 See RUSS, supra note 38, at § 9:1 (stating that through reinsurance, insurers seek
to avoid "passing out of existence"); see also Corcoran, 713 F. Supp at 82 (stating insurers
depend upon reinsurance contracts for financial stability); Stephen Schwab et al., Caught
Between Rocks and Hard Places: The Plight of Reinsurance Intermediaries Under US.
and Enghsh Law, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 485, 489 (1995) (describing congressional
acknowledgment of the importance of reinsurance to insurance companies' solvency).
49 See RUSS, supra note 38, at § 48:26 (showing that insurance industry regularly
uses such tables to ascertain risk and price); see also Charles R. McGuire, Regulation of
the Insurance Industry After Hartford Fire Insurance v. California: The McCarran-
Ferguson Act and Antitrust Policies, 25 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 303, 311 (1994) (stating
insurance companies utilize actuary tables to calculate risks); Todd V. McMillan,
Securitization and the Catastrophe Bond A Transactional Integration of Industries
Through a Capacity-Enhancing Product of Risk Management, 8 CONN. INS. L.J. 131, 164
(2001/2002) (noting the reliance on actuarial tables by insurance companies).
50 Patricia M. Danzon & Scott E. Harrington, Workers' Compensation Rate
Regulation: How Price Controls Increase Costs, 44 J. LAW & ECON. 1, 31 (2001) (observing
that actuarial table findings affect premium payments by predicting possible loss); Jane
Kendall, Comment, The Incalculable Risk: How the World Trade Center Disaster
Accelerated the Evolution of Insurance Terrorism Exclusions, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 569,
573 (2002) (remarking that actuarial tables use statistical data to determine the
probability of an occurrence); Symposium, Implications of the Reconstruction of Lloyd's of
London, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L COMP. L. 1, 17-18 (describing the actuarial process).
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due to their frequency of occurrence and the damage that
particular storms cause.51 Additionally, insurers use such tables
to determine the life expectancy of individuals who purchase life
insurance. 52
There are two basic types of insurance policies: all-risk and
specified-risk policies. 53 The all-risk policy is very much like it
sounds - the policy will cover all losses incurred to that which is
insured except for those specifically excluded in the insurance
contract. 54 The specified-risk policy is the opposite of the all-risk
policy; covering only those injuries set forth specifically within
the insurance contract. 55 Insurance companies use exclusions to
limit the amount of risk that they face in a certain policy.56 The
51 See Insurance, Risk Management & GIS Consulting, at www.georisk.com (last
visited Apr. 13, 2003) (discussing the probability and regularity of storms); see also Ryan
A. Earhart, Lifting the Iron Curtain ofAutomobile Insurance Regulation, 49 S.C. L. REV.
1193, 1201 (1998) (stating insurance companies use various factors to determine risk);
Katherine Swartz, Justifying Government as the Backstop on Health Insurance Markets,
2 YALE J. HEALTH POLY L. ETHICS 89, 104 n.18 (2001) (discussing the effect of actuarial
variables on insurance premiums).
52 See generally Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 991 F.2d 141,
148 (4th Cir. 1993) (asserting "[a]ctuarial tables are the life's blood of the life insurance
industry"); RUSS, supra note 38, at § 4:3 (noting that pension plans reflect the greater
actuarial life expectancy of women by requiring women to make greater contributions);
Actuarial Tables at http://immediateannuity.com/contentpages/actuarial.htm (last
visited Apr. 13, 2003) (providing actuarial tables for males and females as well as a
unisex table).
53 See HOLMES & RHODES, supra note 40, at § 1.6 (dividing coverage for risk into two
categories: all-risk and specified-risk); see also 70 N.Y. JUR. 2D INSURANCE § 1584 (2002)
(distinguishing all-risk insurance from specialty insurance); Richard A. Fierce, Insurance
Law-Concurrent Causation: Examination ofAlternative Approaches, 1985 S. ILL. U.L.J.
527, 528 (1985) (explaining that insurance policies are divided into two categories - all-
risk and enumerated perils policies).
54 See HOLMES & RHODES, supra note 40, at § 1.6 (explaining types of risks devised
under all-risk policies); see also Atlantic Lines Ltd. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 547 F.2d 11,
12 (2d Cir. 1976) (indicating that standard for recovery under all-risk policy is merely
"fortuitous loss"); John P. Gorman, All Risks of Loss v. All Loss: An Examination ofBroad
Form Insurance Coverages, 34 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 346, 347 (1958-59) (explaining that
all fortuitous losses that are not excluded under an all risk policy are covered).
55 See HOLMES & RHODES supra note 40, at § 1.6 (examining operation of enumerated
perils policies); Donna Ferrara, Insurance Issues in Corporate Transactions, 629 P.L.I.,
363, 366 (2000) (stating specific risk insurance covers only enumerated perils); M.
Elizabeth Medaglia et al., The "Concurrent Cause" Theory: Inapplicable to Environmental
Liability Coverage Disputes, 30 TORT & INS. L.J. 823, 833 (1995) (explaining that
coverage under specific risk policies is limited to named perils).
56 See generally Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 505 F.2d
989, 994 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that war risk exclusions on aviation all risk policy did not
apply to loss of plaintiffs aircraft); see also RUSS, supra note 38, at § 110:18 (discussing
the various exclusions found on automobile policies); Robert A. Whitney, Environmental
Contamination and the Application of the Owned Property Exclusion to Insurance
Coverage Claims: Can the Threat of Harm to the Property of Others Ever Get Real, 27 N.
KY. L. REV. 505, 507 (2000) (denoting the purpose of the owned property exclusion as
discharging liability in commercial general liability policies).
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exclusions presently in the media are the terrorist and war
damage exclusions. 57 Until recently, terrorism cover was included
in an all-risk policy. 58 Insurance companies have continuously
excluded war damage from coverage. 59 The ability to obtain such
coverage was dictated by the amount of money the insured was
willing to pay for the coverage as there are specialty insurers for
most every risk known to man.60
Meanwhile, until recently, acts of terror were included in
policies. 61 The beginning of the end for such inclusiveness was
the Irish Republican Army's (IRA) reign of terror in England
during the period before 1993.62 The final incident was the
57 See supra note 35 and accompanying text; see also Bernard Simon, Shake-up in
the Shipping Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2001, at W1 (noting that shipping lines and
insurance companies are engaged in fierce negotiations over war risk surcharges);
Andrew Bolger et al., Dispute Over Airline Insurance Subsidies, FIN. TIMES (London),
Nov. 1, 2002, at Eur. 10 (exploring war risk insurance for airlines).
58 See GRAYDON S. STARING, LAW OF REINSURANCE § 23:3 (1993) (indicating that
terrorism is generally within cover under all-risk policies, and that exclusions usually
need to be explicitly enumerated); see also Pan Am., 505 F.2d at 989 (holding insurers
liable for losses incurred during airplane hijacking on theory that loss did not fall within
the war exclusions); Michael C. Mulitz et al., Current Issues in Aircraft Operating Leases,
C828 A.L.I. - A.B.A., 383, 418 (1993) (indicating that standard aircraft leases require the
lessee to maintain insurance covering war risk and hijacking, including acts of terrorism).
59 See Russ, supra note 38, at § 152:1 (stating that despite the significant possibility
of losses occurring as a result of war, insurers have been reluctant to provide protection
against such losses because of the difficulty in effectively estimating the risk); see also
Queen Ins. Co. of Am. v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 263 U.S. 487, 490 (1924)
(indicating that separate coverage was acquired under a war risk policy to cover excluded
risks on the all-risk policy). See generally Jason B. Libby, Comment, War Risk Aviation
Exclusions, 60 J. AIR L. & COM. 609, 622 (1994-95) (examining the origins of war risk
exclusions during the early development of aviation).
60 See generally Andrew L. Yarrow, A Lucrative Crime Grows into a Costly Epidemic,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1990 at C20 (exploring art insurance held by both galleries and
private individuals); News, Tips, Bargains, Insuring Against a Rainy Day (Or Two), L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 11, 1998 at L3 (reporting that insurance can be purchased against bad
weather for vacations); Christopher Adams, Insurance on World Cup To Be Scrutinized,
FIN. TIMES (London), June 8, 1998 at 1 (discussing the issues surrounding FIFA's
insurance of the World Cup Soccer Tournament).
61 See Hearing on Terrorism Insurance: Rising Uninsured Exposure to Attacks
Heightens Potential Economic Vulnerabilities Before House Subcomm. on Oversight
Investigations, 107th Cong., PP (2002) (Richard Hillman testimony, Director, Financial
Markets and Commodity Investments, stating that insurance companies thought the risk
from acts of terror were so low that it was unnecessary to price such risks into policies);
STARING, supra note 58, at § 23:3 (indicating that coverage for losses occurring as a result
of terrorist acts is generally included under all-risk policies); see also Mulitz et al., supra
note 58, at 418 (explaining aircraft leases require lessees to maintain separate insurance
for terrorism).
62 See Previsions of Terrorism and Riot Coverage in Different Countries: Insurance
and Terrorism in the UK, at http://astre.scor.com/astrehelp/en/Assur/inc/extensionuk/
terrorism.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2003) [hereinafter Terrorism in the UAI (indicating
that during the 1992 - 1993 period alone, the IRA was found responsible for over 19
bombings). See generally Reinsurance (Acts of Terrorism) Act, 1993, at http://www.hmso.
gov.uk/actsl993/Ukpga-19930018en_1.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2003) (defining
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bombing at Harrod's in London. 63 Following this, reinsurers
removed themselves from insuring against terror. 64 This caused
primary insurers to refuse to write policies with such coverage
because of their inability to spread the risk.65 Thus began the use
of the terror exclusion making it nearly impossible to obtain
cover against damage. 66 Such an exclusion is here in America due
to the events of September 11.67
terrorism as "acts of persons acting on behalf of, or in connection with, any organization
which carries out activities directed towards the overthrowing or influencing, by force or
violence, of Her Majesty's government in the United Kingdom"); Thomas A. Player, Jr. et
al., A Global Defmition. 2002 Ann. Conf Asia-Paciic Risk & Ins. Assn. at
http://www.mmmlaw.com/articles/article_152.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2003) (utilizing the
definition of terrorism provided in the Reinsurance Act to construct a universal definition
of terrorism).
63 See Terrorism in the UK, supra note 62 (stating that following the bombing of
Harrod's, the British government "agreed to become insurer of Last Resort for terrorism
losses"); see also Bomb Wounds 4 in London: Exploded Outside of Harrods, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 29, 1993, at A5 (accounting for day's events at Harrods); Stephen Cook, Blast
Revives Memories of Harrods Fatal Bombing, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 29, 1993 at 3
(recounting events, and implicating IRA involvement).
64 See William B. Bice, Comment, British Government and Acts of Terrorism: The
Problems of Pool Re, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 441, 446-47 (1994) (stating that because
the IRA stepped-up bombing efforts in the United Kingdom, reinsurers withdrew from the
market by refusing to include terror coverage in their reinsurance treaties); see also
Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Aftermath of September 11: Myriad Claims, Multiple
Lines, Arguments Over Occurrence Counting, War Risk Exclusions, the Future of
Terrorism Coverage, and New Issues of Government Role, 37 TORT & INS. L.J. 817, 874
(2002) (analogizing the situations that led to the creation of Pool Re with the situations
following September 11th). See generally Andrew Bolger, Rocketing Premiums Make It
Harder To Do Business, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 8, 2002 at Com. Ins. Crisis 3
(discussing the refusal by reinsurers to cover terror following 1993 IRA bombings).
65 See Bice, supra note 64, at 447 (stating that direct insurers were writing terrorism
exclusions into their policies as a reaction to reinsurers' refusal to provide terrorism
coverage); see also Kendall, supra note 50, at 572 (stating insurance is of value to
purchaser because risk is shared across "a pool of other similarly situated but widely
distributed purchasers, guaranteeing for each purchaser protection against substantial
but uncertain losses in exchange of the payment of premiums both certain and
manageable"); Stempel, supra note 64, at 843 (stating "[Ilnsurers... make their money by
distributing risk. The very reason for having insurance is to spread risk.").
66 See Gregg J. Loubier & Jason B. Aro, Practice Tips: Insuring the Risks of Terror,
25 L.A. LAWYER 18, 18 (stating soon after September 11th, insurers began excluding
coverage for losses due to acts of terrorism from new property insurance policies); see also
Kendall, supra note 50, at 581 (explaining eventuality of future disasters similar in
nature to that of September 11th caused breakdown of market mechanisms for providing
terrorism-risk insurance, leading to important changes in insurance and reinsurance
policies); Carl J. Pernicone and James T. H. Deaver, Insurance Implications of the World
Trade Center Disaster, A.B.A. BRIEF 23, 24 (Spring 2002) (stating prominent insurance
company executives have testified before House Committee on Financial Services that
industry would need assistance in order to provide coverage for possible violence in
future).
67 See Best Insurance Policy: Backup Fund Like State, supra note 35 (stating that
following the September 11th attacks, a terrorism exclusion clause will join the war
exclusion clause in United States insurance policies); see also John Hillman, Florida Still
Reviewing Terrorism Exclusions, BESTWIRE, Feb. 6, 2002 (stating California is only state
to formally reject terror exclusions); James G. Rizzo, Tragedy's Aftermath: The Impact of
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Alternatively, companies may set up their own insurance
companies so to have more control over the cost of insurance. 68
For example, captives are insurance subsidiaries set up by
companies solely to share in the risk of the parent company.69
This is one type of alternative presently available to companies
unable to obtain insurance due to the lack of reinsurance and/or
terror coverage in their primary coverage. 70
Another type of insurance alternative is the catastrophe (CAT)
bond.71 The CAT bond allows the purchaser a certain rate of
return for the purchase of the bond. 72 The purchaser would
9/11 on the Insurance Industry, 46 B.B. ASS'N. J. 10, 13 (stating most insurers are
searching for ways to avoid paying for terrorist attacks in the future due to billions of
dollars of losses incurred following September 11th).
68 See Russ Banham, Surviving Soaring Insurance Costs, 5-02 J. ACCT. 69 (2002)
(observing that the September 11th terrorist attacks led to soaring insurance premiums,
and in response, organizations have begun to form their own insurance companies to
reduce premiums and obtain affordable reinsurance); Lorraine Gorski, A Captive
Solution: Steep Hikes in Property/Casualty Premiums Have a Variety of Companies
Looking to Form a Captive Insurance Company, 103:5 BEST'S REV., available at 2002 WL
10441573, (Sept. 1, 2002) (explaining that the creation of an insurance company allows
companies to spread and reduce risks, as well as lower costs); Dutch Firms Set up Own
Insurance to Cut Costs, Dow JONES INT'L NEWS, Dec. 30, 2002 (explaining that dozens of
Dutch firms have created their own insurance companies in an effort to counter the
dramatic rise in insurance costs).
69 See Russ, supra note 38, at § 39:1; see also N.Y. Ins. Law § 7003(a)(1) (McKinney's
2002) (requiring pure captive insurance company to insure, on primary basis, only risks of
parent and affiliated companies); Kevin M. Quinley, Risk Management: Do Captives Still
Make Sense?, CLAIMS MAGAZINE, Nov. 2001, available at www.claimsmag.com/Issues/
NovO1/riskmanagement.asp (last visited Apr. 13, 2003) (stating that captives are "hybrids
between strict retention and full insurance" as well as being either "single- or multi-
parent organizations").
70 See Quinley, supra note 69 (declaring that captives spring up in times of "hard
markets, consisting of high prices and limited capacity"); see also Banham, supra note 68
(explaining "leased captives," another alternative, whereby "several businesses lease risk
transfer capacity from an existing captive"); Ronald D. White, More Firms Carrying
Health Costs Benefits: Rising Premiums are Forcing Smaller and Smaller Employers to
Dump Insurers and Assume Workers'Medical Expenses Themselves, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 15,
2002, § 3, at 1 (stating that approximately two-thirds of the largest employers in United
States have some form of self-insurance).
71 See Bertil Lundqvist, Catastrophe Bonds as a Method of Securitizing Insurance
Risk, 797 PLI/COMM 799, 802 (1999) (stating that cat-bonds are "alternatives to
traditional reinsurance"); see also Robert H. Scarborough, How Derivatives Use Affects
Double Taxation of Corporate Income, 55 TAX L. REV. 465, 507 (2002) (explaining that
catastrophe bonds are a form of "contingent debt instrument"). See generally Frank
Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?" Two Thumbs Down for the Credit
Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L. Q. 619, 674 (1999) (explaining that the increasing
demand for catastrophe bonds has led to creation of "catastrophe indices" that estimate
likelihood of losses for particular geographic areas or "baskets of risk").
72 See Lundqvist, supra note 71, at 805 (stating that the return on invested assets is
provided by a swap counterparty); see also Todd V. McMillan, Secunitization and the
Catastrophe Bond: A Transactional Integration of Industries Through a Capacity-
Enhancing Product of Risk Management, 8 CONN. INS. L. J. 131, 140 (2001/2002)
(explaining that catastrophe bond transactions are structured over a specified risk
period); Viva Hammer & Ann Singer, Insurance Derivatives: A Tax Angle, 518 PLI/TAx
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realize the return as long as the catastrophe in question
(hurricane, tornado, or typhoon) does not occur.73 If the incident
does occur, the purchaser loses the principal. 74
GOVERNMENT AS INSURER
The idea of the government acting as an insurer is not novel.7 5
The government is in the best position to act as an insurer due to
the vastness of its resources and its superior credit rating in the
national economy. 76 The basis of both of these points is the power
to tax. This power enables the government to pass the risk
throughout society.77 It is the ultimate sharing of risk.
951, 967 (2001) (explaining that the varying rates of return were designed to attract
investors with different levels of risk tolerance).
73 See Lundqvist, supra note 71, at 805 (explaining that "if no catastrophe occurs
prior to maturity, investors receive the full principal plus all interest payments"); see also
McMillan, supra note 72, at 141 (explaining that if a catastrophe does not occur, the
bondholder receives principal and interest earned over course of risk period); Benjamin J.
Richardson, Mandating Environmental Liability Insurance, 12 DUKE ENV. L. & POL'Y F.
293, 306 (2002) (explaining that if a disaster does not occur during the bond period, the
bondholder receives return of principal, as well as interest payments).
74 See Lundqvist, supra note 71, at 805 (stating that in event of a catastrophe,
investors risk losing all or a portion of principal); see also Richardson, supra note 73, at
306 (stating if a disaster occurs, the insurer pays claims with catastrophe bond funds that
would otherwise have gone to bondholders); McMillan, supra note 72, at 141 (explaining
that the prospect of loss is contained within the designated risk period).
75 See Testimony before the U.S. Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transp.,
Oct. 30, 2001, available at http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/103001moss.PDF (last
visited Jan. 8, 2003) [hereinafter Moss testimony] (listing several examples of the federal
government acting as an insurer, including federal deposit insurance, workers'
compensation and unemployment insurance); see also Russ, supra note 38, at § 152:7
(noting that during World War II, the government created the War Damage Corporation,
which "provided insurance against damage or loss of property as result of enemy attack or
action of U.S. armed forces in reaction to an attack"). See generally 147 CONG. REC. D.
1067 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 2001) (stating that Moss spoke at hearing on future of providing
insurance for terrorist attacks).
76 See Moss testimony, supra note 75 (stating "unlike private entities, the federal
government is well positioned to absorb even massive losses because it enjoys the power
to tax as well as a near-perfect credit rating."); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Public
Contracts, Private Contracts, and the Transformation of the Constitutional Order, 37
CASE W. RES. 597, 618 (1987) (explaining that like most institutional borrowers, the
government's actions are closely monitored by credit rating agencies, and poor credit
ratings lead to elevated borrowing costs); Theodore P. Seto, Drafting a Federal Balanced
Budget Amendment That Does What It Is Supposed to Do (And No More), 106 YALE L. J.
1449, 1489 (commenting that the United States is able to credibly print money because its
credit rating is so high).
77 See Moss testimony, supra note 75 (explaining that if the premiums collected were
not sufficient to cover losses, the federal government could collect funds from general tax
revenues); see also Wells M. Engledow, Cleaning up the Pigsty: Approaching a Consensus
on Exemption Laws, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 275, 306 (2000) (noting that the federal
government is in a good position to spread risk); Regina T. Jefferson, Privatization: Not
the Answer for Social Security Reform, 58 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1287, n. 172 (citing the
Social Security Program as an example of the federal government's power to tax being
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American Governmental Involvement
The Federal Government is involved in several areas as
insurer of risk.78 The general idea is that the government is to
step in when a catastrophe strikes. 79 The government is
accustomed to insuring man-made risk as only one program deals
with natural disasters.8 0 This further bolsters the premise of the
federal government acting as the insurer of last resort in
situations dealing with terror.
Price-Anderson Act
The Price-Anderson Act (the "Act") passed in 1957.81 The Act
indemnifies operators of nuclear power plants for damages
resulting from accidents.82 In so indemnifying the operators of
utilized to spread risk across a broader population).
78 See Moss testimony, supra note 75 (listing examples such as federal bankruptcy
law, product liability law, state insurance funds, foreign investment insurance, disaster
relief, unemployment insurance, and old-age insurance); Jill Brenner et al., Financial
Institutions Fraud, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 631, 633, (2002) (highlighting the federal
government's role in insuring against financial fraud); Arthur B. LaFrance, The Changing
Face of Law and Medicine in the New Millennium: Tobacco Litigation: Smoke, Mirrors
and Public Policy, 26 AM. J. L. & MED. 187, 201 (2000) (discussing the implications of the
federal government's involvement in health care insurance).
79 See Michele L. Landis, Fate, Responsibility and "Natural" Disaster Relief-
Narrating the American Welfare State, 33 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 257, 260 (1999) (recognizing
that government intervention in the area of unemployment is necessary when catastrophe
strikes the poverty level); Michele L. Landis, 'Let Me Next Time Be Tried By Fire"'
Disaster Relief and the Origins of the American Welfare State 1789-1874, 92 Nw. U.L.
REV. 967, 1028 (1998) (recalling President Roosevelt's efforts to direct the Federal
Government to recognize the Great Depression as a catastrophe, so that it may intervene
as such). See generally Jan Gorrie, Property Insurance in Florida: The 1997 Legislative
Reform Package, 25 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 351 (1998) (explaining that state government
intervention is necessary in area of property insurance when catastrophe strikes in
Florida).
80 See 42 U.S.C. § 4001 (1994) (providing federal insurance coverage for floods - the
sole mother-nature inspired calamity insured by the federal government); see also Saul
Jay Singer, Flooding the Fifth Amendment: The National Flood Insurance Program and
the "Takings" Clause, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 323, 337 (1990) (explaining that the
federal government insures against floods the private insurance industry could not and
would not do it). See generally Bryan Ford, The Uncertain Case for Market Pricing of
Health Insurance, 74 B.U.L. REV. 109, 134 (1994) (noting that the federal government is
facing tumultuous times in the health insurance industry).
81 Price-Anderson Act 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1994). See John Karl Gross, Note, Nuclear
Native America: Nuclear Waste and Liability on the Skull Valley Goshute Reservation, 7
B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 140, 143-44 (2001) (stating the Price- Anderson Act was passed in
1957 to protect the public and encourage the development of atomic energy); see also
James Kuntz, Nuclear Incidents on Indian Reservations, 21 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 103, 105
(1996) (discussing the reasons for the passage of the Price-Anderson Act in 1957).
82 See 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1994) (providing the content of the Price-Anderson Act);
Gross, supra note 81, at 144 (noting that Price-Anderson Act indemnifies private actors
who are exposed to liability from a nuclear accident); Kuntz, supra note 81, at 105 (noting
that under the Price-Anderson Act, all public liability claims arising from nuclear
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the nuclear power plants, the Act limits the overall liability of
the individual reactors for each accident.8 3 The statute binds the
government to furnish $500 million for damages per nuclear
incident within the United States. 84 The Act further specifies a
$100 million dollar limit for damages incurred outside the
country.8 5 The nuclear plant operator must obtain insurance up
to the limit available in the private marketplace. 86 Currently, the
amount of private insurance available to operators is
approximately $200 million.8 7
If an accident occurs which exceeds the private insurance level,
the operators of all reactors must pay into a secondary insurance
fund.88 The amount paid is not to exceed $10 million per year per
operator. 89 The nuclear industry is presently responsible for
claims up to $9.5 billion before the government's involvement
kicks in. 90 The government is not required to support the
incidents that are above the amount of required public insurance will be indemnified by
the federal government).
83 See Gross, supra note 81, at 144 (explaining that the Price-Anderson Act limits the
aggregate liability that can be imposed on private entities licensed by the federal
government to engage in nuclear activities); Kuntz, supra note 81, at 105 (stating that the
Act placed a ceiling on the aggregate liability that could be imposed upon those entities
which engaged in nuclear activities under contract with, or licensed by the federal
government); John Burritt McArthur, Cost Responsibility or Regulatory Indulgence for
Electricity's Strained Cost, 47 AM. U.L. REV. 775, 864 n.16 (1998) (noting that the Price-
Anderson Act limited utility liability for any single nuclear plant disaster).
84 See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(c) (1994) (stating that the "aggregate indemnity for all
persons indemnified in connection with each nuclear incident shall not exceed $500
million.").
85 See 42 U.S.C.§ 2210(d)(5) (1994) (stating that in the case of nuclear accidents
occurring outside of the United States, the amount of indemnity provided for under the
Act "shall not exceed $100,000,000").
86 See U.S.C. § 2210(b)(1) (1994) (stating that the amount of primary financial
protection required by the Nuclear Energy Commission "shall be the amount of liability
insurance available from private sources").
87 See Hillman testimony, supra note 33 (noting that this is the maximum amount
per reactor, per accident); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b)(1) (1994) (stating that the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission may establish a lesser amount); Cheryl Kessler Clark, State
Liability Under CERCLA for Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal. Preparing for the
Inevitable, 11 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 587, 655 n.201 (1994) (noting that the liability
insurance must be the maximum amount of coverage available at a reasonable cost on the
private market).
88 See Hillman testimony, supra note 33 (stating that these contributions could reach
as high as $88.1 million per reactor, per accident); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (b)(1) (1994)
(postulating that the charges are deferred, at least in part, until it appears likely that the
liability will exceed the primary financial protection of the licensee involved in the
incident); Clark, supra note 88 at 646 (explaining that the second layer of coverage does
not apply until the operator's insurance funds are exhausted).
89 See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b)(1) (1994) (providing that the maximum amount charged to
a facility following a nuclear incident is $10 million).
90 See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b)(1) (1994) (providing that the maximum amount charged to
a facility following a nuclear incident is $10 million); Hillman testimony, supra note 33
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operators if the damages exceed the secondary insurance fund.91
In such a situation, Congress would investigate an incident and
the legislators would make the final determination upon the
funds needed to rectify the situation.92
This statute has been in existence for close to a half-century
and the government has not been called upon to fund excessive
losses. 93 The continuation of this system was before Congress
recently.94 Given the present state of affairs, it is likely that the
government will extend the Price Anderson Act to cover the
nuclear industry in cases of an incident. 95
(calculating that the 106 reactors each pay $10 million for nine years). Cf Clark, supra
note 87, at 655 n.202 (stating that the total limit of liability per reactor incident is
approximately $7.5 billion).
91 See Hillnan testimony, supra note 33 (stating "[I]n the event of an accident that
involves damages that exceed the amount in the secondary insurance fund the
government is not explicitly required to fund the balance"); Dan M. Berkovitz, Price-
Anderson Act: Model Compensation Legislation?-The Sixty-Three Million Dollar
Question, 13 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1989) (stating that maximum private insurance
available is taken and any excess liability could be covered by the government); Chris
Addicott, Note, Double Indemnity for Operators of Nuclear Facilities? In Re Hanford
Nuclear Reservation Litigation, The Price-Anderson Act, and the Government Contractor
Defense, 72 WASH. L. REV. 505, 510-11 (1997) (stating that primary liability insurance
plus retrospective secondary insurance caps operators liability at 8.4 billion in 1997).
92 See Hillman testimony, supra note 33 (stating "Price-Anderson commits the
Congress to investigate the accident and to take whatever action it deems necessary");
Joseph H. Sommer, Note, Transformative Torts, 97 YALE L. J. 645, 648 (1988) (stating
that in case of nuclear incident Congress will review incident and take action necessary to
protect public). See generally Priest, Does Tort Reform Threaten Judicial Independence?
Roundtable, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 694, 695 n.3 (2001) (stating that Price-Anderson Act
contains an explicit congressional commitment to take further action to aid victims of a
nuclear accident in the event that the $ 560 million ceiling on liability is exceeded).
93 See Hillman testimony, supra note 33 (stating "no nuclear accidents have occurred
since Price-Anderson was enacted that cost more than was provided by the ... private
insurance"). See generally John F. McNett, Nuclear Indemnity For Government
Contractors Under The Price-Anderson Act: 1988 Amendments, 19 PUB. CoNT. L. J. 1, 11
(1989) (suggesting that in the event of a catastrophic nuclear event, compensation plans
would be submitted by the President within ninety days of a determination by a court
that public liability may exceed aggregate liability limits); Karen Goxem, Comment,
Emergency Offsite Planning For Nuclear Power Plants: Federal Versus State and Local
Control, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 417, 426 n.62 (1988) (stating that Federal government would
intervene only in event that award exceeded amount of indemnification).
94 See H.R. 2983, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 597, 107th Cong. (2001); see also Matt
Bivens, Who Pays for Nuclear Power, THE NATION, Nov. 30, 2001. But see Suzanne
Struglinski, Republican Control Could Help Industry Fulfill Agenda, ENV'T & ENERGY
DAILY, Dec. 2, 2002 (stating that 107th Congress failed to re-authorize the Price-Anderson
Act).
95 See Struglinski, supra note 94 (suggesting that 108th Congress is likely to pursue
re-authorization of the Price-Anderson Act); Late News In Brief, NUCLEAR NEWS, Dec.,
2002, at 18 (stating that representatives of the nuclear industry, nuclear insurers,
railroads, and contractors, urged Congress to renew the Price-Anderson Act by the end of
2002); Elaine Hiruo, Abraham Urges Congress To Pass Comprehensive Energy
Legislation, NUCLEONICS WEEK, Sept. 26, 2002, at 7 (stating that approved resolutions
thus far include the extension of the Price-Anderson Act for another 15 years).
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Political Risk Insurance
The federal government has installed a plan to cover
investments lost due to action by foreign sovereigns. 96 An agency
operates the program and finances itself.97 The agency operates
under the auspices of the State Department. 98 The official
agency name is the Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(the "Agency"). 99 The program covers investments lost due to
"war, revolution, insurrection, civil strife, or confiscation."100
The insurance offered by the agency is far broader for
liabilities covered as compared to private insurance of the same
type.10' The agency uses premiums to finance the program.102
Before underwriting a policy, the agency will submit the proposal
96 See 22 U.S.C. § 2194(a)(1)(B) (1994) (authorizing the Corporation to issue
insurance covering loss of investment "due to expropriation or confiscation by action of a
foreign government); Rob B. Drumheller, Overseas Private Investment Corporation OPIC
Official Export Credit Agencies: United States of America, PROJECT FIN., Nov. 1, 2002, at
S126 (stating that political risks insured by OPIC include expropriation and political
violence). See generally Maria O'Brien, Shooting The Rapids, LATIN FIN., Apr. 2002, at 15
(stating that OPIC has written political risk insurance policies for 2,600 projects and paid
claims on 268 of them since 1971).
97 See 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (1994) (creating an agency to "mobilize and facilitate the
participation of United States private capital and skills" in less developed and
transitional areas and countries); Hillman testimony, supra note 33, at 4. See generally
Vneshtorgbank Signs Agreement with OPIC, ROSBUSINESSCONSULTING DATABASE, July
5, 2002 (stating that OPIC is a U.S. independent self-financing federal agency that
finances various projects, insures capital investments and provides other services to U.S.
investors abroad); Zambia: US Government Offers $500m For Viable Projects, AFR. NEWS,
Mar. 14, 2001 (noting that OPIC, which is a U.S. government self-financing agency, is the
investment arm of the U.S. government in Africa and other places).
98 See 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (1994) (stating that the Corporation is an agency acting
under the policy guidance of the secretary of State). See generally Joan M. Smith, North
American Free Trade and the Exploitation of Working Children, 4 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS.
L. REV. 57, 101 (1994) (stating that OPIC works under the policy guidance of the State
Department); Mark A. Garfinkel, OPIC Adjusts In The Post-Enron Era, METROPOLITAN
CORP. COUNS., Oct., 2002, at 48 (stating that OPIC works closely with and receives
foreign policy guidance from the State Department).
99 See 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (1994) (creating the Overseas Private InvestmentCorporation).oo 22 U.S.C. § 2194(a)(1)(C) (1994).
101 See Hillman testimony, supra note 33, at 4 (stating "the coverage offered by OPIC
is more comprehensive both in scope and duration than the coverage currently available
from private sector insurers."). See generally Joseph R. Biden, Jr., The Environment and
World Trade, 23 ENVTL. L. 687, 693 (1992) (stating that OPIC offers coverage at an
appropriate premium). But see Thomas Ellinidis, Foreign Direct Investment In
Developing And Newly Liberalized Nations, 4 D.C.L. J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 299, 326 (1995)
(stating that premium varies depending on nature of risk and coverage).
102 See 22 U.S.C. §2194; see also Mark R. Yzaguirre, Project Finance and
Privatization: The Bolivian Example, 20 HOuS. J. INT'L L. 597, 617 (1998) (stating that
OPIC is self-sustaining and earns income through charging premiums). See generally
Bice, supra note 64, at 466 (stating that OPIC works like ordinary insurance company
and uses premiums to create reserve for paying claims).
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to the Foreign Relations Committees in both houses of
Congress.103 It will supply the Committees with the necessary
information to establish the safety of the policy issued.104 The
manner in which the corporation establishes reserves and
premiums is based on expert opinion and less on standardized
actuarial models.O5 The main reason the Agency uses this
method is that it is extremely difficult to ascertain the actions of
foreign governments, as it is difficult to ascertain the actions of
terrorist organizations.106 This would appear to be an example of
where the federal government is needed to insure risks that are
either uninsurable or, due to the lack of standard actuarial
methodologies, exorbitantly expensive to the point that it would
inhibit economic development and the expansion of American
economic interests.107
103 See 22 U.S.C. §2194(a)(4) (1994) (requiring the Corporation to submit to Congress
a report before issuing business interruption insurance for the first time and in each
instance when there is to be an expansion in the type of risk insured under business
interruption coverage). See generally, Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, Conditioning Trade on
Foreign LaborLaw: The US. Approach, 9 COMP. LAB. L. 253, 277 (1988) (illustrating that
OPIC proposed to Congress methods of selecting countries in which to allow investors);
Roger C. Wesley, Expropriation Challenge in Latin America: Prospects for Accord on
Standards and Procedures, 46 TUL. L. REV. 232, 286 (1971) (alluding to fact that Congress
must approve funds for OPIC program).
104 See 22 U.S.C. §2194(a)(4) (1994) (stating the report to Congress will include "a
thorough analysis of the risks covered, anticipated losses, and proposed rates and
reserves[.l"); see also US. Representative Henry Hyde (R-IL) Holds Hearing On The
Administration's National Export Strategy, FDCH POLITICAL TRANSCRIPTS, May 15, 2002
(statements of Ross Connelly, Executive Vice President of OPIC) (illustrating
presentation by OPIC before House International Relations Committee). See generally
Perez-Lopez, supra note 103 (illustrating how OPIC conducted annual reviews of the
relevant issues and notified Congress of their findings to help Congress make a decision).
105 See Hillman testimony, supra note 33 (stating that the methods used to set
premium rates rely heavily upon expert judgment and not upon standard actuarial
models); Bice, supra note 64, at 444 (noting an economically efficient premium cannot be
calculated because of a lack of perfect information). See generally Melinda L. Reynolds,
Landowner Liability for Terrorist Acts, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 155, 202-03 (1996)
(stating premiums charged are based on many different factors).
106 See generally Michael W. Gordon, The Overseas Private Investment Corporation:
Risk Management Principles, 48 TUL. L. REV. 480, 495 (1974) (stating OPIC insured risks
are among the more difficult in determining possible outcome variations and probability
of occurrence); R. Doak Bishop et al., Strategic Options Available When Catastrophe
Strikes the Major International Energy Project, 36 TEX. INT'L L.J. 635, 685 (2001) (noting
that OPIC insurance covers terrorism); Reynolds, supra note 106, at 181-82 (stating
terrorists have different motivations from ordinary criminals; a terrorist act is not a
random assault).
107 See Bishop et al., supra note 105, at 685 (stating OPIC insurance enhances the
likelihood that the insured will collect if there is a catastrophe). See generally David
Blumenthal, Sources of Funds and Risk Management for International Energy Projects,
16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 267, 284 (1998) (stating products eligible for insurance must have
positive effects on U.S. unemployment, be financially sound, and bring significant
economic and social benefit to host company); Ruth Rosauer, Emerging Market Debt
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Riot Insurance
During the late 1960's, urban areas of the United States
erupted in violence.108 The private insurance industry declined
insuring inner city neighborhoods, citing fear of continued
violence causing significant losses.109 The refusal to insure these
areas was to put an end to the development of the urban
regions.l10  The federal government responded with the
establishment of the National Insurance Development
Program. "'
This program was to enable the reinstatement of private
insurance for urban areas with the federal government acting as
reinsurer. 12 The plan stressed the cooperation of insurers with
Instruments Play Siren Song for Pension Plans, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 211, 222 n.95
(1998) (mentioning OPIC insures currency risk, expropriations, and political violence).
108 See Rhonda R. Rivera, Book Note, Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities, 132 U.
PA. L. REV. 391, 397 (1984) (noting that on June 27, 1969 gay people first fought back
against police harassment in the Stonewall riots in New York City);
www.ydr.com/page/riotltimeline (last visited Jan. 31, 2003) (stating that in 1968, riots
erupted in York, Pennsylvania, injuring dozens and killing two people, one of whom was a
police officer); Quintard Taylor, African American Men in the American West, 1528-1990,
569 ANNALS 102, 114 (2000) (describing the 1965 Watts riots as the largest African-
American civil uprising in the nation's history).
109 See Hillman testimony, supra note 33 (stating insurers became reluctant to
underwrite property insurance in communities considered to be at risk for such events);
see also Bryan Ford, The Uncertain Case for Market Pricing of Health Insurance, 74
B.U.L. REV. 109, 118 n.44 (1994) (mentioning the crisis of property insurance availability
after the 1967 riots in United States because insurers could not calculate probability of
future riot losses); Leah Wortham, Insurance Classification: Too Important to be Left to
the Actuaries, 19 U. MICH. J. L. REV. 349, 396 (1986) (mentioning the Urban Property
Protection and Riot Reinsurance Act of 1968 provided insurance to those denied by
private market).
110 See David Dante Troutt, Ghettoes Made Easy: The Metamarket/Antimarket
Dichotomy and the Legal Challenge of Inner-City Economic Development, 35 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 427, 494 (2000) (positing "unaffordable insurance as barrier to city's
economic growth"); see also David Dante Troutt, Ghettoes Revisited: Antimarkets,
Consumption, and Empowerment, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 16 (2000) (suggesting that the
availability of insurance is essential to economic development). See generally Audrey G.
McFarlane, Race, Space, and Place: The Geography of Economic Development, 36 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 295, 352 (1999) (noting that insurance redlining has an effect on economic
development).
111 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb (1994) (stating "purpose of the National Insurance
Development Program is to "provide a Federal Program of reinsurance against
abnormally high reinsurance losses resulting from riots"); see Insuring Terrorism After
September 11th: Before the Comm. On Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs of the US.
Senate, 107th Cong., PP (2001) (J. Robert Hunter, Dir. of Insurance, Consumer
Federation of America, discussing the Riot Reinsurance program under provisions of the
Urban Property Protection Act); see also Patricia D. Gugin, Conditioning Access to the
Public Forum on the Purchase of Insurance, 17 GA. L. REV. 815, 848 n.175 (1983)
(mentioning that the National Insurance Development Program "[pirotects victims of
urban rioting from extensive property loss").
112 See 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-4 (1994) (designed to assure fair access to insurance
requirements); see also Hillman testimony, supra note 33 (stating the program provided a
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state insurance authorities.1' 3 The director of the plan, with
input from state authorities, was to determine the need to form a
pool of insurers so to provide the necessary insurance needed in
the area.114 The federal reinsurance was made available to
insurers on a voluntary basis."15 The primary focus of the plan
was to allow the insurers to enter into the Fair Access to
Insurance Requirements Plan (the "Plan"),116 and in so entering,
the insurer would make available property insurance to
consumers in urban areas.11 7 By offering the insurance to
consumers in high profile areas, the insurers would cede the
majority of the risk to the Plan."18 When a claim was made an
insurer's retained portion of risk would be paid before the
voluntary federal program of reinsurance); Gugin, supra note 111, at 848 n.175
(mentioning Act protects victims of urban rioting from property loss).
113 See 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-3(a) (1994) (stating "[Elach insurer reinsured under this
title shall cooperate with the state reinsurance authority"); 12 U.S.C. §1749bbb-5 (stating
all insurers shall file a statement pledging its full participation and cooperation); see also
Hillman testimony, supra note 33 (mentioning the requirement that states share in losses
with federal government).
114 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-6(a)(2) (1994) (stating each state insurance authority shall
advise the Director concerning the operation of the plan); see 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb(b)(2)
(1994) (stating Director shall process, verify and pay claims for reinsured and directly
insured losses). See generally New Jersey Ins. Underwriting Ass'n v. Clifford, 270 A.2d
723, 728 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1970) (mentioning that the commissioner may amend
plan after consultation with Director of the Association).
115 See 12 U.S.C. §1749bbb-3 (1994) (stating "Congress left it to states to enact
insurance plans to implement the Congressional purpose behind Urban property
Protection and Reinsurance Act"); see also Regina Austin, The Insurance Classification
Controversy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 523 n.27 (1983) (noting "several states chose to
forego federal riot reinsurance."). See generally 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-7 (1994) (discussing
the preliminary requirements for federal reinsurance eligibility).
116 See generally 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-5 (1994) (stating each state must file a
statement with appropriate authority to be a participant in plan); 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-6
(1994) (stating each state insurance authority must submit to Director any proposed or
adopted plan); 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-6a (1994) (stating Director shall review each plan and
methods used to carry it out).
117 See Hillman testimony, supra note 33 (stating the National Insurance
Development Program provided a federal program of reinsurance for urban property
owner's offering relief from abnormally high rates in private markets); see also John
Hugh Gilmore, Insurance Redliing & The Fair Housing Act: The Lost Opportunity of
Mackey v. Nationwide Insurance Companies, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 563, 579 (1985) (stating
the government guarantee would allow insurance companies to continue to provide basic
property insurance in urban areas). See generally William E. Murray, Homeowners
Insurance Redlining The Inadequacy ofFederal Remedies and the Future of the Property
Insurance War, 4 CONN. INS. L. J. 735, 740 (1998) (stating the only solution to insurance
redlining is enactment of a federal law specifically defining and prohibiting the practice).
118 See Hillman testimony, supra note 33 (revealing that insurers were required to
assume liability for a limited amount of the risk); see also Gilmore, supra note 117, at
578-80 (highlighting government guarantee backing insurance issued under this
program). See generally Jill Gaulding, Race, Sex, and Genetic Discrimination in
Insurance: What's Fair 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1646, 1660 (1995) (noting the availability of
reinsurance to insurers who offered coverage in high risk areas).
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government's. 19 To further spread the risk, states were required
to share in the program's losses., 20 The government terminated
the riot insurance program in 1984, stating that inadequate
involvement by insurers was the basic reason. 121
War Risk Insurance
Insurance companies routinely exclude coverage for losses
incurred because of war or similar circumstances. 122 They have
done so because the damages are virtually limitless and the
probability of such damage occurring is relatively
unpredictable.123 Furthermore, it is conceivably the duty of the
government to protect its citizens from the aggressions of foreign
sovereigns and the losses incurred by such actions. 124
119 See Hillman testimony, supra note 33 (stating that "Insurers could transfer most
of the remaining risk by making a premium payment to the federal government, which
then assumed the remaining liability. This liability ranged from 90 to 98 percent...").
See generally Gaulding, supra note 118, at 1660 n. 92 (presenting the general history of
such reinsurance programs); Gilmore, supra note 117, at 578-80 (describing the
government's insurance solution to riot protection in late 1960's).
120 See 12 U.S.C.§ 1749bbb-9(a)(1) (1994) (requiring each state to adopt legislation
reimbursing the federal government for any reinsured loss occurring within the state);
Hillman testimony, supra note 33 (declaring that the program mandated states to divide
losses with federal government). See generally Gilmore, supra note 117, at 578-80
(analyzing federal response to problems raised in insurance industry following 1960's
riots).
121 See 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb(b)(1) (1994) (terminating the authority of the Director on
November 30, 1985); Hillman testimony, supra note 33 (identifying lack of participation
as the chief reason for discontinuing program); see also Gilmore, supra note 117, at 579
n.120 (explaining that the decision to terminate program occurred late in November,
1983).
122 See Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 505 F.2d 989, 994
(2d Cir. 1974) (indicating that coverage for losses attributable to war is excluded from
insurance coverage); see also Kathryn K. Jensen, War and Military Action Exclusions:
Property Insurance and the Attack on the U.S., 49 INS. WEEK, Nov. 1, 2001 at 43 (stating
"standard property insurance forms generally.., exclude loss due to 'war'. . ."). See
generally, Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Mixed Bag for Chicken Little: Analyzing Year 2000
Claims and Insurance Coverage, 48 EMORY L. J. 169, 174 (highlighting typical exclusions
from insurance coverage).
123 See Jason B. Libby, War Risk Aviation Exclusions, 60 J. AIR L. & COM. 609, 655
(1994-95) (identifying arbitrary nature of loss due to circumstances such as war). See
generally Victor Epstein and Steve Jordan, Property Insurers Push for Federal "Backup'
on Terrorism Damage Coverage, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Feb. 19, 2002, available at
LEXIS, News & Business, Market & Industry, Insurance, Insurance News (discussing
lack of applicable risk standards to determine loss for war); Daniel W. Pugh, Insurer
Liability for Environmental Cleanup: Do Contract Principles Excuse Performance, 48
BUS. LAW. 1707, 1725 (1993) (noting that insurance companies will exclude coverage for
events of extreme risk).
124 See Dennis Kelly, Insurers at NAIC Fret Over Terror Reinsurance Bill, at
http://www3.ambest.com/Frames/FrameServer.asp?Site=news&Tab= l&altsrc=18&RefNu
m=46371 (last visited Apr. 13, 2003) (indicating that "Scott Gilliam, secretary for
Cincinnati Insurance Companies said. . . the federal government should share in the
terrorism risk because it is a societal problem caused by government politics."); Thomas
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Currently, Congress has stepped into the insurance market, at
least temporarily, to ensure the airline industry's ability to
procure insurance after the incidents of September 11.125
Similarly, in years past, the federal government has become
involved in securing insurance for various parts of the economy
when an event made it nearly impossible for the retention of
insurance in the private market.126 The statutes passed before
World War II enabled the maritime industry to get the needed
insurance despite private insurers refusal to write war
coverage. 127
Flood Insurance
Natural disasters occur semi-regularly in the United States. 28
It may be a tornado, hurricane or earthquake. The vastness of
the nation make it prone to damage caused by Mother Nature.
For this very reason, insurers became leery of underwriting
policies concerning flood damage. 129
Oldt, Winter Haven Officers Lack City's Support, THE LEDGER (Lakeland, Fla), Mar. 16,
1997, at F5 (asserting that "[the first duty of every democratic government is to protect
its citizens from foreign enemies. . ."); Sen. Betty Simms, Letters From the People, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 10, 1996, at 13B, (declaring that a government's primary duty
is toprotect those in its borders).
125 See 49 U.S.C. § 44302(a)(1) (1994) (authorizing the Secretary of Transportation to
provide insurance and reinsurance against loss arising out of the operation of an
American aircraft); see also Jennifer Thompson and Simon Sloane, War and Terrorism -
Exclusions, Extensions and Market Issues of Aggregation in the Non-Marine Markets,
Holman, Fenwick, and Willan (2001), available at http://www.hfw.com/13/new/pdfs/war
&ins.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2003) (indicating speculation of forthcoming government
aide to airline industry in wake of September 11th attacks); Senate Approves Relief
Package for Airlines, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison Times), Sept. 22, 2001, at 4B (describing
actions taken by Congress to aide airline industry following events of September 11th).
126 See 46 U.S.C. § 1282 (1994) (providing statutory authority for federal reinsurance
to maritime industry during periods of war risk); see also Best Insurance Policy: Backup
Fund Like State, supra note 35, at 2E (stating that "Congress created the War Damage
Corporation in WWII, with $1 billion in assets, to pay for property damage caused by the
war"). But see 46 U.S.C. § 1294 (1994) (limiting duration of authority of Secretary of State
to provide federal reinsurance under 46 U.S.C. § 1282).
127 See 46 U.S.C. § 1282 (1994) (allowing federal government to provide insurance in
event that private insurance companies would not); see also Best Insurance Policy:
Backup Fund Like State, supra note 35, at 2E (outlining Congress' preparatory action for
maritime industry prior to WWII). But see 46 U.S.C. § 1294 (1994) (terminating power to
issue insurance after WWII ended).
128 See http://www.georisk.com (last visited Apr. 13, 2003) (illustrating inherent
risks caused by natural hazards); see also http://www.fema.gov/library/drcys.shtm (last
visited Jan. 31, 2003) (indicating federally declared disasters by calendar year). See
generally Fire Prevention Tips, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Aug. 2, 2001 at S7
(stating that "a wide range of natural disasters occurs within the United States every
year.").
129 See Hillman testimony, supra note 33, at 6 (stating that "increasing losses from
floods because of floodplain encroachment" was one factor used by the insurance
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The government's response was the formation of the National
Flood Insurance Fund.130 The National Flood Insurance Act of
1968 established the program.131 The Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) initially supervised the program.132
Eventually, the responsibility was transferred to the Director of
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).133 The
program allows persons residing in flood zones to purchase
federal flood insurance. 134 The program also encourages the
participation of private insurers in furnishing such insurance to
property owners.1 35 It is solely a voluntary program. 136 Primarily,
industry). See generally Oliver A. Houck, Rising Water: The National Flood Insurance
Program and Louisiana, 60 TUL. L. REV. 61, 67-68 (1985) (identifying problems
encountered by private insurance companies in underwriting flood risk); Michael F.
Reilly, Transformation at Work: The Effect of Environmental Law On Land Use Control,
24 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 33, 63 (1989) (denoting several factors that lead to the
federal government's adoption of insurance aide for flood lands).
130 42 U.S.C. § 4017(a) (1994); see also Hillman testimony, supra note 33 (discussing
governmental efforts to insure against floods following the National Flood Insurance Act
of 1968). See generally Reilly, supra note 129, at 33 (highlighting congressional efforts to
deal with problems arising from the insurance provision in flood areas).
131 See 42 U.S.C. § 4001 (1994) (discussing the necessity and reasons for the flood
insurance program); see also Arthur C. Nelson and Steven P. French, Plan Quality and
Mitigating Damage from Natural Disasters: A Case Study of the Northridge Earthquake
with Planning Policy Considerations, 68 J. AM. PLAN. ASSN. 194 (2002) (discussing the
Act and its role in the National Flood Insurance Program). See generally Stempel, supra
note 64 (citing the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968).
132 See 42 U.S.C. § 4003(a)(6) (1994) (defiming "Director"); see also About FEMA, at
http://www.fema.gov/about/history.shtm (last visited Apr. 13, 2003) (describing the role of
HUD in flood assistance). See generally History of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, at http://truedemocracy.net/td3/shadow/sO8.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2003)
(discussing HUD and the National Flood Insurance Act).
133 See 42 U.S.C. § 4003(a)(6) (1994) (defining "Director"); see also Jeff Hecht, Storm
Warning, NEW SCIENTIST, Nov. 21, 1998, at 2020 (discussing the role of Director of
Federal Emergency Management Agency). See generally P.J. Maddox, Bioterrorism: A
Renewed Public Health Threat, DERMATOLOGY NURSING, Dec. 1, 2001, at 437 (discussing
FEMA).
134 See 42 U.S.C. § 4011(a) (1994) (describing national flood insurance program); see
also Hillman testimony, supra note 33 (stating that the National Flood Insurance
Program makes federal flood insurance available to property owners living in
communities that join the program); William M. Coats, Allison Flood Insurance, TEXAS
CONSTRUCTION, Aug. 2001, at 54 (discussing purchase of federal flood insurance). See
generally Doug McInnis, Biotech Justice, SOYBEAN DIGEST, Feb. 2002, at 2 (citing federal
flood insurance).
135 See 42 U.S.C. § 4011(c) (1994) (encouraging participation by insurance
companies). See generally US Plans to Reinstate Flood Cover Scheme, INS. DAY, Dec. 17,
2002 (discussing property owners' flood insurance); Lucy Griffin, Flood Insurance Errors
Can Wash Away Profits, ABA BANKING J., Oct. 2002, at 88 (describing the importance of
flood insurance).
136 See 42 U.S.C. § 4012(c) (1994) (discussing the availability of insurance); see also
Flood Insurance Risk Classification, PUB. MGMT., Jan. 1, 2001, at 31 (describing policy
holders of National Flood Insurance Program). See generally NFIP, at http://www.fema.
gov/nfiplcustfaq.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2003) (discussing the National Flood Insurance
Program).
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premiums and fees from policyholders in addition to
appropriations from Congress finance the National Flood
Insurance Fund.137 This financing method is not sound as the
long-term expenditures on flood damage far outstrip the receipts
from premiums and fees.138 Such financing forces Congress to
fund the program rather than it surviving on its own. 139
Foreign Jurisdictions'Dealings with Insurance against Terror
United Kingdom
Terror squarely confronted the British government during the
late 1980's and throughout the 1990's.140 The Irish Republican
Army ("IRA") was trying to oust the British from Northern
Ireland for decades.141 In 1992, the IRA began a brutal wave of
bombings that lead to losses in life and property.142 During this
137 See 42 U.S.C. § 4017(b) (1994) (stating credits to fund); see also Peter Lavigne,
Reforming National Flood Insurance, Special Section: America Under Water, USA TODAY,
July 1994, at 43 (discussing the financing of the National Flood Insurance Program). But
see Ken Rankin, The Eye of the Storm: Will Congress Respond to Industry Pleas for Key
Changes in the Federal Flood Program?, INS. REV., Sept. 1989, at 49 (discussing the poor
financing of the flood program).
138 See Hillman testimony, supra note 33 (explaining that financing of National
Flood Insurance Program does not result in income sufficient to build reserves and meet
long-term expenditures on flood losses); see also In 10 Years, Government Liabilities More
Than Tnple, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 4, 1981, at 60 (citing various government
liabilities); Margaret Kriz, Shoring Up Flood Insurance, NAT'L J., Sept. 4, 1993, at 2128
(discussing the financing problems of NFIP).
139 See Hillman testimony, supra note 33 (noting that Congress has had to
appropriate funds from time to time to finance the National Flood Insurance Program);
see also The Flood Insurance Administration: Has Begun Collecting a $25 Surcharge on
Flood Insurance Policies, INS. REV., Sept. 1991, at 14 (discussing Congressional financing
of the fund); Peter Lavigne, Reforming National Flood Insurance, USA TODAY, July 1994,
at 43 (noting the serious problems in NFIP's financial management).
140 See Terrorism in the UK supra note 62 (listing the numerous acts of terrorism
that occurred in Great Britain during the late 1980s and the 1990s); see also Blair's Deal
with Libya's Qadha7 DEF. & FOREIGN AFFS. STRATEGIC POL'Y, Aug. 2002, at 3 (citing
terrorist IRA operations in UK); Andrew Johnson, Terror's Tangled Web, LEGAL WEEK,
May 16, 2002 (discussing IRA terrorist acts).
141 See COLM Fox, THE MAKING OF A MINORITY: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN DERRY
AND THE NORTH 1912-25 (1997) available at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk.othelem/fox.htm (last
visited Jan. 31, 2003) (discussing uprising in 1916 and years following as modem starting
point for Ireland's "Troubles"); Mari Fitzduff & Liam O'Hagan, The Northern Ireland
Troubles: INCORE Background Paper, at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk.othelem/incorepaper.htm
(last visited Jan. 31, 2003) (positing that the partition of Ireland in 1921 was a natural
progression in Britain's attempt to dominate Ireland since settlers arrival in 12th
Century); see also UK Treasury Denies Need to Hurry as Pool Re Talks Run On, INS.
DAY, July 19, 2002 (discussing Britain's response to the IRA bombing campaign).
142 See Bice, supra note 64, at 446 (describing the IRA bombings of Britain in the
early 1990s); see also Terrorism in the UtX supra note 62 (listing the numerous IRA
bombings that occurred in Britain and providing the death tolls from these attacks);
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period, the IRA either claimed responsibility or was suspected of
involvement in multiple bombing incidents.143 The response of
insurers, especially reinsurers, was to exclude coverage for losses
due to terrorist actions.144  Without reinsurance, primary
insurers could not underwrite policies covering terrorism because
the risk was too high that an incident would bankrupt the
insurer. 145
The British Government joined the fray in February 1993.146
The government system established the Pool Reinsurance
Company ("Pool Re").147 It was a mutual insurance company
formed by the government solely for the coverage of losses due to
terrorism. 148 The government acts as the reinusurer of Pool Re
Christopher Boyd, Safety in the Sky, MALAY. BuS., Nov. 1, 2002, at 52 (discussing the IRA
bombings around the United Kingdom).
143 See Terrorism in the UK, supra note 62, at 7 (stating that during 1992 and 1993
period alone, the IRA was found responsible for over 19 bombings); see also The State has
Role in Cat Planning, INS. DAY, Oct. 24, 2002 (discussing the IRA bombings in London in
early 1990's); Lawrence Mark Cohen, New Priorities Take Hold in the UK, SECURITY
MGMT., July 1, 2002, at 48 (discussing the long-running IRA bombing campaign against
mainland Britain).
144 See Terrorism in the UK, supra note 62 (marking January 1, 1993 as the date
reinsurers refused to continue reinsurance coverage in the UK); see also Bice, supra note
64, at 446-47 (noting that reinsurers such as Munich Reinsurance of Germany announced
that effective January 1, 1993, terrorism coverage would be excluded from their
reinsurance treaties); Richard Stevenson, Britain to Help Insurers Cover Terrorism Risks,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1992, at D2 (reporting that British insurers could not find reinsurers
following the wave of bombings).
145 See Bice, supra note 64, at 447 (explaining that the unavailability of reinsurance
caused primary insurers to write terrorism exclusions into their own policies); see also
Terror Uninsurd, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 25, 1992, at 18 (commenting that British
insurers lack the capital to bear the full risk independent of continental reinsurers); UK
Insurance, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 14, 1992, at 18 (describing as unacceptable the
exposure of British primary insurers who were no longer backed by continental
reinsurance).
146 See Terrorism i the UI supra note 62 (entering timeline entry for February
1993: "UK Government agrees to become Reinsurer of Last Resort for terrorism losses");
see also Bice, supra note 64, at 448 (noting that in December, 1992, the British
government, responding to public and industry pressure, announced that it would take
action to ensure that coverage for terrorist attacks would be made available). See
generally United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: Comparative Examples
of Existing Catastrophe Insurance Schemes at http://rO.unctad.org/insuranceprogramme/
publicat.html, Sept. 29, 1995, at 24 (last visited Jan. 31, 2003) [hereinafter United
Nations) (outlining the Pool Re System).
147 See Bice, supra note 64, at 441 (providing a brief historical background of Pool
Re); see also Reinsurance (Acts of Terrorism) Act 1993 (c.18) at www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/
acts1993/Ukpga_19930018_en1.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2003) (enabling Secretary of
State to enter into reinsurance agreements and defining "acts of terrorism"); United
Nations, supra note 146, at 29 (explaining that the establishment of Pool Re did not
require any new legislation but that the Reinsurance (Acts of Terrorism) Act of 1993 was
required to enable the Secretary of State to enter into a reinsurance agreement with Pool
Re).
148 See Bice, supra note 64, at 441 (explaining formation of Pool Re); see also United
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and responds in such manner only when the company is unable
to meet its liabilities.1S9 Pool Re contracts solely with the
insurance companies themselves.150 It is a voluntary program.151
An insurer may continue to seek and obtain coverage in the
private market. 152
One hundred eighty-one insurance companies compose Pool
Re.153 Member insurers continue to offer terror coverage up to a
certain limit.154 That limit has been set at D100,000 pounds
Nations, supra note 146, at 23 (describing perils insured under the Pool Re system). But
see Terrorism in the UK, supra note 62 (noting that in 1999 some were calling for an
extension of Pool Re to cover potential Y2K losses).
149 See United Nations, supra note 146, at 24 (explaining that Pool Re acts as a
reinsurer to primary insurers while the government provides reinsurance to reinsurers);
see also Bice, supra note 64, at 453 (describing the ultimate liability of the British
government when Pool Re is exhausted); Terrorism in the UTJ supra note 62 (stating that
the British government will indemnify Pool Re should claims exceed the total remitted
premiums available).
150 See United Nations, supra note 146, at 24 (stating that insurers who wish to
reinsure with Pool Re must apply and enter into an agreement with Pool Re); see also
Terrorism in the UK, supra note 62 (indicating that the government has no locus in the
relationship between insurers and Pool Re). But see Richard Lapper, Row Over Premiums
Threatens Insurance Cover for Terrorism, FIN. TIMES (London), June 11, 1993, at 1
(quoting industry members alleging that the history of Pool Re indicates a lack of
willingness to cooperate with insurance companies).
151 See United Nations, supra note 146, at 24 (explaining that membership in Pool
Re is not obligatory); see also Terrorism in the UK7 supra note 62 (noting that
membership in Pool Re is not mandatory for insurers operating in Great Britain). Cf
Bice, supra note 64, at 450-51 (specifying that while insurers have the option of electing
additional coverage through Pool Re, they must purchase coverage for all property as
opposed to only for high-risk property).
152 See United Nations, supra note 146, at 24 (noting that insurers are free to seek
terrorism reinsurance from private reinsurers); see also Terrorism in the UK, supra note
62 (clarifying that insurers may receive terrorism insurance from elsewhere if they want).
But see Bice, supra note 64, at 456 (arguing that once the British government stepped in,
it effectively barred the entry of private companies that may otherwise have considered
underwriting terrorism reinsurance).
153 See Pool Re and Terrorism Insurance in Great Britain, Tillinghast-Towers Perrin
Update, at http://www.tillinghast.com/tillinghast/publications/publicationstill _update_
ukIUK_Pool_Re andTerrorisml200205211.pdf (Oct. 2001) (last visited Jan. 31, 2003)
(indicating that Pool Re is composed of 104 insurance companies incorporated in the UK
and 77 insurance companies incorporated in other countries around the world); see also
Terrorism in the UAT supra note 62 (providing membership statistics when Pool Re came
into being in 1993 [129 insurance companies and 88 Lloyd's syndicates] and as of October
1997 (184 insurance companies plus 64 Lloyd's syndicates]). Cf Bice, supra note 64, at
450 (providing 1994 membership totals of 115 insurance companies and 120 Lloyd's
syndicates).
154 See United Nations, supra note 146, at 25 (stating that original insurers provide
coverage to policy holders up to the minimum level of £100,00); see also Bice, supra note
64, at 450 (noting that direct insurers are exclusively responsible for all coverage up to
this specified limit without reinsurance); Changes to the Pool Re Scheme at
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/mediastore/othefiles/ACF1DOD.pdf (last visited Apr. 13,
2003) [hereinafter Changes] (stating Pool Re operates a retention under which insurers
bear the first amount of any claims).
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sterling for each line of insurance written by the company.155
That portion is the full responsibility of the insurance companies
and is not subject to reimbursement by Pool Re.]56 The ability to
seek reimbursement from Pool Re commences when the amount
of damages exceed the 0100,000 limit.157 Pool Re will reimburse
insurers for amounts beyond the limit as long as the fund is
solvent.158 If the fund is lacking resources, Pool Re will make a
"call" of an additional ten percent of premiums. 159 All insurance
companies in the Pool are responsible for providing the fund with
this "call."160 If the fund is insolvent, unable to meet its liabilities
despite the ten percent call, then the British Government will
step forward as the reinsurer of the reinsurer. 161
155 See Changes, supra note 154 (stating retention is generally £100,000); see also
Terrorism in the V7< supra note 62 (explaining that member insurers are required to cede
all additional premium for cover above £100,000 to Pool Re); United Nations, supra note
146, at 25 (indicating that the lower limit of indemnity is established at £100,00 for each
section of the policy).
156 See Bice, supra note 64, at 450 (explaining that claims that fall below the
minimum limit will be borne entirely by the direct insurer with no reimbursement from
Pool Re); see also Terrorism in the UI< supra note 62 (indicating that most insurers
restrict the amount of coverage available to £100,000); United Nations, supra note 146, at
25 (stating original insurers are responsible for first £100,00 of each section of the policy).
157 See United Nations, supra note 146, at 25 (placing the responsibility for paying
the first £100,000 on original insurers); see also Ralph Atkins, CUFocuses on Overseas
Expansion, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 22, 1996, at 24 (informing that Pool Re covers
claims of more than £100,000). See generally Christopher Elliott & Angela Mackay,
Bankers Defy Government to Seek City "Ring of Steel", THE TIMES (London), June 7, 1993
(stating "terrorism claims of more than £100,000 will be paid by Pool Re").
158 See United Nations, supra note 146, at 25 (stating claims are paid so long as
funds are not exhausted). See generally Suzanne Capner, New Jitters for London, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 17, 2001, at W1 (expounding on Pool Re's purpose); Robert K. Meyers &
James A. Maguire, Responding to Terrorism, Bus. INS., May 23, 1994, at 18 (describing
how Pool Re works).
159 See Bice, supra note 64, at 453 (stating "[ilf the premiums paid to Pool Re do not
cover the losses caused by a terrorist attack, then an additional ten percent "call" is levied
on the member insurers in the pool"); see also Lenore Taylor, UK Offers Insurance Model,
AuSTL. FIN. REV., July 16, 2002, at 5 (noting that if Pool Re's "resources are exhausted,
the member companies are required to contribute another 10 per cent"). See generally
United Nations, supra note 146, at 25 (examining the lower and upper limits of
indemnity).
160 See Bice, supra note 64, at 453 (noting "[ajll member insurers are liable for the
call"); see also Taylor, supra note 159 (recognizing that members of Pool Re are required
to contribute an additional 10 per cent). See generally Libby Bruch, Terror Coverage
Prompts Concerns: Although Some Commercial Insurers Are Responding To The Need
For Terrorism Coverage, Much About The Risk Remains Unknown, 13 RISK & INS. 36
(2002) (reporting that Pool Re members pay claims over £100,000 sterling).
161 Terrorism in the UI supra note 62 (stating any claims beyond the premiums
collected by Pool Re and the 10% call would be met by the Government as the "ultimate
insurer."); see also Siow Li Sen, GIA Terrorism Insurance Study Almost Ready, BUS.
TIMES (Singapore), Oct. 21, 2002, (commenting that the British government "is the
insurer of last resort"). See generally Lee Barnes, A Closer Look At Britain's Pool Re, 49
RISK MGMT., May 1, 2002, at 18 (stating "the U.K. government indemnifies Pool Re for
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This entire system is to ensure that the British economy does
not suffer for lack of insurance. Without reinsurance, primary
insurers would not write policies and banks would not lend
money because of the possible catastrophic losses.162 If the banks
did lend money, the rate would be significantly higher than it
presently is because they would have to factor in the possible loss
of their capital due to terror. 163
Spain
The Spanish Government has established the Consorcio de
Compensacion de Seguros ("Consorcio"), an independent entity
with separate legal status. 64 Its role is to cover losses due to
natural catastrophes, army and police interventions in
peacetime, terrorism and other extraordinary events. 165 The
Consorcio operates through the collection of premiums for the
services offered.166 All policies written by an insurer must contain
qualifyg claims that exhaust Pool Re's resources").
162 See Jackie Spinner, Terrorism-Insurance Battle Looms, WASH. POST, June 14,
2002, at E02 (claiming primary insurers purchase reinsurance as a protection against
cataclysmic losses); see also Diane Levick & Micheal Remez, State Insists On Terror
Coverage, HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 15, 2001, at El (noting that banks will not lend
money if businesses do not have terrorism insurance). See generally Morais, supra note
45, at 76 (explaining that insuring insurance companies is the business of reinsurance).
163 See generally How Much Are Americans At Risk Until Congress Passes
Terrorism Insurance Protection?: Before the House Subcommittee on Oversight &
Investigations, Committee on Financial Services, 107th Cong., 50-54 (2002) available at
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/bank/hba78186.000hba78186_O.HTM (last visited
Jan. 31, 2003) (Deborah B. Beck, Executive Vice President of the Real Estate Board of
New York, stating that lenders demand terrorism coverage before making or renewing
large scale loans); Spinner, supra note 162 at E02 (noting that without terrorism
insurance, banks will be reluctant to lend); Russ Banham, Terrorism Insurance: Pray as
You Go, available at http://www.cfo.com/printarticle/0,5317,6633%7CA,00.html (Feb. 4,
2002) (last visited Apr. 13, 2003) (discussing how without government assistance,
companies are left with little coverage against terrorism).
164 See Terrorism in the UK, supra note 62, (stating Consorcio de Compensacion de
Seguros is distinct from the state); see also Carolyn Aldred & Mark A. Hofmann, Much
Discussion but Few PubliclPrivate Deals so Far: Government Role Seen in Terrorism Risk
Pools, BUS. INS., Mar. 25, 2002, at 3 (noting that Consorcio de Compensacion de Seguros
is Spain's state-backed insurance pool). See generally United Nations, supra note 146, at
5 (profiling Spain's catastrophe insurance scheme).
165 See Andrew Bolger, Insurers of Last Resort Get First look: Terrorism Outside the
US, FIN. TIMES (London), May 24, 2002, at 2 (noting that the Consorcio de
Compensacion de Seguros covers "extraordinary risks"); see also Gene Rappe, Should
Insurers Cover Terrorism PROP. & CASuALTY, Jan. 11, 1999, at 7 (noting that he
Consorcio de Compensacion de Seguros provides coverage for terrorism and natural
disasters). See generally Carolyn Aldred, Insurance Pools Untapped; Some Governments
Guarantee Terrorism Coverage, BUS. INS., Sept. 24, 2001, at 35 (identifying the scope of
Consorcio de Compensacion de Seguros coverage).
166 See United Nations, supra note 146, at 5 ("[Tjhe Consorcio is empowered to
decide its own rates, which must then be incorporated into the premium charged for every
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an Extraordinary Event Cover. 167
An event that is not covered under a policy, or, even if covered,
is unable to be paid because of an insurer's financial difficulties
triggers the fund into action.1 68 The fund only covers tangible
losses.169 Other losses, such as business interruption, lost profits,
are termed the insured's responsibility to obtain specific
coverage.170 The loss itself does not have to be of a certain
amount; rather, it merely must have the possibility of a large
loss.171 The Consorcio is financed by the collection of premiums
for the services offered. 172 Therefore, there is no minimum
insurance policy.. ..")
167 See Terrorism in the UK supra note 62, at 14; United Nations, supra note 146, at
5.
168 See United Nations, supra note 146, at 6 (positing "[tihe perils insured are chosen
on the basis of their enormous loss potential[.]"); see also Graham Buck, Europe's
Pendulum of Risk. The Single European Currency is Now a Reality in 12 Countries, But
Insurance and Risk Managers Remain Preoccupied with the Terrorism Issue, 13 RISK &
INS., Feb. 1, 2002, at 1 (noting: "[T]he Consorcio de Compensacion de Seguros, was set up
more than 40 years ago to provide property damage cover for a full range of catastrophic
risks."); David Hartzell & Pablo Weslowski, Post-[WTC Solution Spain Provides Model
That Has Worked, INS. DAY, Nov. 1, 2001, at Law (stating: "SICF is only required to
provide compensation when the extraordinary loss is not specifically covered under an
insurance policy; or when ... the relevant insurance company cannot meet its obligations
because it is insolvent, or has suspended payments, or been declared bankrupt or put into
compulsory liquidation.").
169 See United Nations, supra note 146, at 6 (stating "the indemnity covers solely
material losses"); Hartzell & Weslowski, supra note 168, at Law (explaining policies
covering property damage incorporate SICF coverage); see also Buck, supra note 168, at 1
(stating the purpose of the Consorcia de Compensacion de Seguros was to provide
property damage for catastrophes); see also Aldred, supra note 165, at 35 (stating
coverage is limited to material damage); Buck, supra note 168, at 1 (explaining coverage
by SICF "does not extend to business interruption, third party liability, or construction
risks").
170 See United Nations, supra note 146, at 6 (explaining "loss of profits and other
indirect losses are deemed to be a matter for voluntary coverage, which should always be
extended by the free market."); see also Aldred, supra note 165, at 35 (stating coverage is
limited to material damage); Buck supra note 168, at 1 (explaining coverage by SICF
"does not extend to business interruption, third party liability, or construction risks").
171 See United Nations, supra note 146, at 6 (explaining the event need not be
termed a "catastrophe" in order for the fund to become involved in an incident); see also,
Hartzell & Weslowski, supra note 168, at Law (stating "SICF's main function is to
indemnify... losses caused by extraordinary events). See generally, Robert C. Meder,
Global Solutions to Terrorism Coverage, RISK MGMT., May 1, 2002, at 10 (describing types
of extraordinary or catastrophic losses covered).
172 See Consorcio de Compensacion de Segur6s, The Extraordinary Risk Coverage,
MINISTRY ECONOMY, Spain, § 10 Financing the Cover of the Consorcio, (2000) available at
http://www.consorseguros.es/publicaciones/friesgextra.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2003)
(explaining surcharges are its main source of funds); United Nations, supra note 146, at 5
(stating "[Tihe Consorcio is empowered to decide its own rates, which must then be
incorporated into the premium charged for every insurance policy[.]"); see also Aldred,
supra note 165, at 35 (explaining how reserves are funded by surcharges on premiums);
Hartzell & Weslowski, supra note 168, at Law (outlining how premiums are collected by
SICF).
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amount to trigger the fund making a payment to the
policyholder. 173 All policies written by an insurer must contain an
Extraordinary Event Cover. 174
The Consorcio premiums are mandatory.175 The fee is termed a
tariff and must be collected by the insurance companies
regardless of whether the coverage purchased includes the
specified risks of the fund.176 Insurers remit the Consorcio rates
directly to the fund on a monthly basis. 177 The fund may
accumulate a catastrophe reserve with its assets usable for any
contingency regardless of when the fees in the reserve were
received.178 If the Consorcios's funds prove inadequate to meet
173 The fund does not make payments to the insurer as a reinsurer, rather the Fund
makes a payment directly to the insured suffering the loss. Therefore, the program does
not act as a subsidy for the insurance industry but it is another layer of insurance for the
individual policyholder. There is a deductible for property damage that is generally 10% of
the amount of the loss; for larger losses, the deductible can rise to 15%. See United
Nations, supra note 146, at 6. Further, different types of losses carry with them variant
deductibles. See Hartzell & Weslowski, supra note 168, at Law. For a comparison of the
different approaches taken by the European community to the problem of insurance
coverage for terrorism catastrophes see generally Meder, supra note 171, at 10.
174 See Terrorism in the UX supra note 62, at 14 (listing types of insurance required
to enclose an Extraordinary Event Cover); see also, Hartzell & Weslowski, supra note 168,
at Law (explaining that in Spain, insurance for extraordinary risks is automatically
extended by SICF to a policy holder when he takes out certain classes of insurance). See
generally United Nations, supra note 146, at 5 (highlighting Spain's catastrophe
insurance scheme).
175 See United Nations, supra note 146, at 8 (describing surcharge as "obligatory");
see also Consorcio De Compensacion De Seguros, Informative Note, MINISTRY ECONOMY,
Spain available at http://www.consorseguros.es/notainfo/fnotainfo-ing.htm (last visited
Apr. 13, 2003) (stating "From the moment when [insurance companies] begin activity in
Spain, insurance Entities are thus required to collect the surcharges and settle them with
the Consortium."). See generaly Aldred, supra note 165, at 35 (calling the coverage
"compulsory" for certain types of insurance).
176 See United Nations, supra note 146, at 8 (explaining the tariff is incorporated
into premiums "irrespective of whether the original policy provides for the risk");
Consorcio de Compensacion de Segur6s, The Extraordinary Risk Coverage, supra note
172, at § 9 (explaining how mandatory surcharges irrespective of policy coverage allow
coverage for extraordinary risk that would otherwise be impossible); see also Hartzell &
Weslowski, supra note 168, at Law (stating that "[tihe insurer is required to include the
charges irrespective of whether the risk is covered, or excluded, from the original policy").
177 See United Nations, supra note 146, at 8 (stating the Consorcio is "paid monthly
by insurers"); Hartzell & Weslowski, supra note 168, at Law (explaining insurers must
settle accounts with SICF "on a monthly basis"). See generally Consorcio De
Compensacion De Seguaros, Guide to the Settlement and Payment of Compulsory
Surcharges in the Consorcio De Compensacion De Seguaros'Favour, MINISTRY ECONOMY,
Spain, (2001) available at http://www.consorseguros.es/publicaciones/friesgextra.htm (last
visited Apr. 13, 2003) (outlining Compensacion De Seguros payment procedures).
178 See United Nations, supra note 146, at 8 (describing how "surpluses from years
when premiums exceed claims are transferred," forming a catastrophe reserve); Consorcio
de Compensacion de Segur6s The Extraordinary Risk Coverage, supra note 172, at § 10
(explaining how "accumulation of resources and on broad compensation in time...
[taking the form] of a Stabilization Reserve" allows Spain to cover intense risks); Hartzell
& Weslowski, supra note 168, at Law (describing "a special accumulative technical
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the liabilities caused by the above-mentioned situation, the
Spanish Government guarantees the funds liquidity.179
Currently, the fund has been in existence for fifty-five years. 180 In
that half century, the need to step in has not presented itself to
the government. 181
South Africa
The South Africa Special Risks Insurance Association
(SASRIA)182 was set up to deal with local riots, insurrection, and
terrorism in South Africa.] 83 Established in 1976, the Association
is considered the forbearer of Pool Re in the United Kingdom.184
provision to which all surpluses from years where premiums exceed claims are
transferred.").
179 See Consorcio de Compensacion de Segur6s, The Extraordinary risk Coverage,
supra note 172, at § 10 (stating "the Consorcio [is] backed by the government guarantee in
order to meet any indemnity obligations that overrun its financial capacity"); see also
United Nations, supra note 146, at 8 (noting that claims are guaranteed by Spain if funds
were insufficient); Hartzell & Weslowski, supra note 168, at Law (indicating that fund is
guaranteed by Spain).
180 See Consorcio de Compensacion de Segur6s, The Extraordinary Risk Coverage,
supra note 172, at § 2 (detailing the history of the Consorcio De Seguros); Hartzell &
Weslowski, supra note 168, at Law (mentioning the fund has more than fifty years of
experience). See generally United Nations, supra note 146, at 8(discussing the Consorcio).
181 See Consorcio de Compensacion de Segur6s, The Extraordinary Risk Coverage,
supra note 172, at § 2 (boasting "the adequate reserves collection and the strict financial
management have enabled the Consorcio to meet its indemnity liabilities, even in the
worst cases of claims that have occurred for more than fifty years . . . ."); United Nations,
supra note 146, at 8 (restating that the Consorcio has never needed to avail itself of the
state guarantee); see also Hartzell & Weslowski, supra note 168, at Law (indicating
funds have never been insufficient).
182 See United Nations, supra note 146, 18 (stating SASRIA was established on April
1, 1979 as a tax-exempt non-profit insurance company with the government acting as the
Association's reinsurer); SASRIA, SASRIA Overview at www.sasria.co.za/about.html (last
visited Apr. 13, 2003) (noting SASRIA celebrated its 20th year as a special risks insurer
in Feb. 1999); see also Sapa, Plan to Privatize Risk Insurance Body, DISPATCH ONLINE,
Nov. 7, 1998 at http://www.dispatch.co.za/1998/11/07/southafrica/INSURANC.HTM (last
visited Apr. 13, 2003) (discussing the privatization of SASRIA).
183 See United Nations, supra note 146, at 18 (explaining the reasons for the
establishment of SASRIA); see also Conversion of SASRLA Act, REPUBLIC OF S. AFR.
GOV'T GAZETTE Dec. 4, 1998, at 2, available at www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/
legislation/1998/actl34.pdf (stating SASRIA was incorporated in order to insure against
property damage caused by political acts). See generally Nigel Benneton, Short Term
Insurance - Terrorism exclusions extended, S. AFR. INS. TIMES AND INVESTMENTS
(June/July 2003) available at http://www.insurance-tines.netlEditorials/ 2002/June2002/
shortterm_insurance_.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2003) (discussing difficulties involved
with access to terrorism insurance and reinsurance after the September 11th attack).
184 See Terrorism in the UI7 supra note 62 (noting that Pool Re was basically
modeled upon the structure of the SASRIA system); see also Melinda L. Reynolds, Note,
Landowner Liabii'ty for Terrorist Acts, 47 CASE W. RES. 155, 202 (1996) (suggesting that
"[tlhe British Government essentially agreed to become the 'reinsurer of last resort' for
losses caused by terrorist acts"). See generally Bice, supra note 64, at 441-45 (analyzing
the Pool Re system and the role of reinsurance).
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The insurance covers both politically and non-politically
motivated damages.' 85
The insured purchases the coverage from the primary
insurer.18 6 The insurer does not retain the risk for the listed
damages, 8Vrather, SASRIA accepts the full risk for the specified
situations from the primary insurer.18 8 The insurance companies
act as de facto agents of the Association; they collect the fees,
write the policies, and administer the claims presented by the
insured. 8 9 The insurance companies themselves do not provide
the coverage for the insured,190 yet they do consult with the
185 See Terrorism in the UK, supra note 62 (explaining "the South African
Government agreed to become reinsurer of last resort against politically-motivated
riot.., and non-political riot, strike and public disorder"); see also United Nations, supra
note 146, at 18 (stating: "The insured perils are riot strike, politically motivated malicious
damage .... ."). See generally SASRIA, History of SASRIA, at http://www.sasria.co.za/
history.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2003) (noting "SASRIA's perils were extended to cover
damage caused by non-political riot and public disorder, which includes labour
disturbance, civil commotion, strike and lockout.").
186 See Terrorism in the UK, supra note 62 (noting "the policy holder purchases
cover from the insurer who handles the administration and claims but retain none of the
risk"); see also Benneton, supra note 183 (discussing potential problems with the South
African Insurance Industry's new terrorism exclusion clause). See generally SASRIA,
History of SASRL4, supra note 185 (discussing the establishment of SASRIA).
187 See Terrorism in the UK, supra note 62 (noting "the insurer... retain[s] none of
the risk); see also United Nations, supra note 146, at 18 (stating that "private insurers did
not want to provide cover for politically-motivated terrorism"). See generally Bice, supra
note 64, at 442-43 (defining and discussing reinsurance).
188 See Terrorism in the UK, supra note 62, at 15 (stating "all events covered by
SASRIA are specifically excluded from the underlying insurance policies of all insurance
companies in South Africa by the standard SAIA exclusion clauses"). See generally Sapa,
supra note 186 (noting SASRIA's obligations to its policy holders); SASRIA, History of
SASRIA, supra note 185 (describing SASRIA's coverage).
189 See Terrorism in the UK, supra note 62 (noting "the policyholder purchases
cover.., from the insurer who handles the administration and claims. .. ."); see also
Wendy Lopes, Policy Holder Protection Rules Under the Short-Term Insurance Act, 1998,
SASRIA, May 7, 2001, available at http://www.sasria.co.za/statutorynoticecircular.doc
(last visited Apr. 13, 2003) (recognizing "we [(SASRIA)] do not have direct dealing with
the insuring public, nor do we carry out any administrative functions relative to the
issuing of covers and collection of premium. ... ."); M.P. Strydom, Political, Labour and
Terrorism Insurance: The South African Experience, Oct. 2002, available at
http://www.sasria.co.za/Circulars/IBA%20PRESENTATION.pdf (noting "despite
participation of Members and Government neither had proprietary rights in SASRIA or
its assets").
190 See United Nations, supra note 146, at 20 (explaining that SASRIA is managed
and administered by SAIA, and until 1992 the insurance companies had been involved in
supplying some of the reinsurance but since December 31, 1992 the companies are no
longer that involved); see also Ruwantissa Abeyratne, Crisis Management Toward
Restoring Confidence in Air Transport - Legal and Commercial Issues, 67 J. AIR L. &
COM. 595, 606 (2002) (explaining "[Pool Re] insurers collect premiums for terrorism
insurance and the government promises to chip in if claims exceed the pool's premiums
plus reserves"); Reynolds, supra note 188, at 202 (noting five layers of terrorism coverage
must be exhausted before the British Government becomes liable in the Pool Re system).
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Association to set rates at commercially viable levels.191 SASRIA
is the ultimate payor of claims presented to the insurers by
policyholders. It does not act as re-insurer of the primary policy
carriers. 192  The Association compensates the insurance
companies for their efforts by allowing them to retain a
percentage of the premium charged the consumer. 193 SASRIA
behaves as a private insurance company in that it also seeks to
insure its covered policies via the international reinsurance
market. 194
However, SASRIA's lack of adequate resources to cover claims
allows the South African government to play a role in the
insurance scheme.195 The government does not charge SASRIA
premiums for the ultimate reinsurance coverage.196  The
191 See United Nations, supra note 146, at 21(explaining how SASRIA's rates are
set); see also SASRIA, Schedule of Rates, at http://www.sasria.co.za/product.html (last
visited Apr. 13, 2003) (listing SASRIA's rates for various coverage types). See generally
Conversion of SASRLA Act, supra note 188 (explaining rates and disbursements of funds).
192 See Terrorism in the UK, supra note 62, at 20 (noting "the [SASRIA] fund has to
arrange commercially acceptable reinsurance cover"); see also SASRIA, History of
SASRIA, supra note 185 (explaining SASRIA's history as a reinsurer of the short term
insurance industry). See generally Reynolds, supra note 188, at 202 (explaining that in
Pool Re system, the government is the last resort payor of claims).
193 Id. See Terrorism in the UK, supra note 62, at 20 (positing that the retention
amount allowed is 15% while no more than 5% of that may be paid to any agent or
broker). See generally Sapa, supra note 186 (discussing privatization of SASRIA);
SASRIA, History of SASRL4, supra note 185 (explaining how SASRIA's policies were
implemented).
194 See Terrorism in the UK, supra note 62, at 19 (explaining claims are met by the
first year's premiums and reserves, after which commercial reinsurance comes in); see
also Benneton, supra note 183 (noting difficulties involved with access to terrorism
insurance and reinsurance after the September 11th attack). See generally Bice, supra
note 64, at 443-46 (discussing the purpose and importance of reinsurance).
195 See id. at 21 (indicating that the Soweto riots in 1976 and the subsequent
insurance withdrawal as necessitating government involvement in insuring against such
risks); see also Business as Usual?, REACTIONS, Apr. 1986 (indicating that the
government is responsible for any losses over the coverage provided by the SASRIA);
Government Terrorism Schemes: With a Little Help from Their Enemies, REACTIONS,
June 15, 2002 (providing SASRIA as a form in which the government assists private
insurers to bear the burden of terrorism claims).
196 The government does not charge SASRIA a premium because to do so would
reduce the reserve it possesses to fund its liabilities. The rationale is that to reduce the
reserve for the payment of a premium would expose the government to involvement at an
earlier date than if it did not charge such a fee. The fee would cause the government to
enter the fray before it had to, something the government desires to understandably
avoid. See Terrorism in the UA supra note 62, at 21. The problem is that the premiums
being collected are hardly enough to cover "current attritional losses, let alone
catastrophes." See Emerging Markets; In Search of a Pot of Gold, REINSURANCE MAG.,
Oct. 1, 1999, at 31. However, SASRIA works hand-in-hand with the South African
government to insure against riots. See generally Linda Ensor, SASRIA Agrees to
Government Appropriation of Billions From Its Reserves, BUS. DAY, Nov. 4, 1998, at
News 1.
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government acts as the insurer of last resort to stabilize the
economy and to allow it to survive as best as it can in the face of
possible terrorist activities within the South African nation. 197
The fund has made payments on claims. In 1993, claims reached
approximately 200 million Rand. The premiums were
approximately R450 million per year and the reserve had
amassed to approximately R4 billion. 198
Israel
The State of Israel has a bifurcated system for dealing with
losses due to terror.199 The first level is the Property Tax and
Compensation Fund.200 The second is the Law for the Victims of
the Enemy Action.20 1 Each level deals with a different part of the
insurance system. 202 The Israeli government supports the two
197 See Terrorism in the UK, supra note 62, at 18 (indicating that the government
wished to keep the industry involved in the scheme as much as possible to take advantage
of its expertise in the area of insurance); see also Dee Rissik, Special Report on South
Africa: Marginal Change Expected in Riot Cover, LLOYD'S LIST, May 30, 1994 (indicating
the government as the reinsurer of last resort); Government May Pinch SASRIA Funds,
WORLD INS. REP., Apr. 18, 1997 (noting that governments agreement to be reinsurer of
last resort under the South African regime).
198 See Terroism in the UK, supra note 62, at 15 (providing that in 1993, SASRIA
generated 450 million Rand in premiums); see also Rob Rose, SASRIA Under Fire for 20%
Premium Hike, BUS. DAY, Dec. 6, 2002, at 11 (indicating that in 2001, SASRIA made
more than 400 million Rand); Government May Pinch SASRIA Funds, supra note 197
(indicating that SASRIA possessed 8.5 billion Rand in assets 1997).
199 See Hillman testimony, supra note 33, at 8 (noting Israel's bifurcated insurance
system to deal with terrorism); see also James G. Rizzo, Tragedy's Aftermath: The Impact
of 9/11 on the Insurance Industry, 46 B.B. ASS'N J. 10, 13 (2002) (indicating that Israel
has two government-backed insurance systems); Howard Kunreuther, The Role of
Insurance in Managing Extreme Events: Implications for Terrorism Coverage, BUS.
ECON., Apr. 1, 2002, at 6 (providing that Israel provides two governmental insurance
programs to deal with terrorism).
200 See Terrorism in the UK, supra note 62, at 15 (indicating Property Tax and
Compensation Fund as the first of two prongs in the system); UNITED NATIONS, SECURITY
COUNCIL COMPENSATION COMMISSION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION MADE BY THE
PANEL OF COMMISSIONS CONCERNING THE FIFTH INSTALLMENT OF "Fl" CLAIMS, U.N. Doc.
S/AC.26/2001/15 available at www.unog.ch/uncc/reports/rOl-15.pdf at 21 (2001)
(hereinafter "Security Council") (the law "passed in 1961 to provide a fund for the
payment of real and personal property damage arising from, inter alia, war damage."); see
also Andrew Bolger, Terrorism: Outside the US, FIN. TIMES, May 24, 2002, at 2
(indicating the Property Tax and Compensation fund as one of the means the Israeli
government offers insurance against terrorism and war-like acts); Rizzo, supra note 199,
at 13 (indicating Property Tax and Compensation Fund as the first type of government-
backed insurance for acts of terrorism).
201 See Hillman testimony, supra note 33, at 8 (indicating this as the second prong of
Israel's terrorism insurance system); see also Meder, supra note 171, at 10 (indicating
that Israel also offers insurance under Victims of Enemy Action); Rizzo, supra note 204,
at 13 (indicating Law for the Victims of Enemy Action as the second type of government-
backed insurance for acts of terrorism).
202 See Hillman testimony, supra note 33, at 8 (differentiating the two types of
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systems in their entirety.203
Property and casualty insurance is the realm of the Property
Tax and Compensation Fund.204 Readily apparent because of its
title is the manner in which the government supports this fund -
taxes. A national property tax finances the fund.205 A special
commission is in charge of the fund and its sole mission is the
determination of claims concerning hostile terrorist actions. 206
The program only covers direct property damage.207 Agency
regulations determine the extent of the state coverage. 208
The Fund has made payments on claims during the existence
of the program.209 For example, during the Gulf War the fund
coverage that the Israeli government provides); see also Meder, supra note 171, at 10(describing types of coverage under both schemes); Rizzo, supra note 204, at 13 (indicating
Property Tax and Compensation Fund provides property and casualty insurance, and the
Law for the Victims of Enemy Action covers life and health and insurance).
203 See Hillman testimony, supra note 33, at 8 (providing that the Israeli government
pays for both types of insurance); see also Peter Carayannopoulos & Mary Kelly, Insuring
"Terror." A Canadian Perspective, CAN. INS. June 1, 2002, at 8 (noting that Israel
assumes all responsibility for insurance); Rizzo, supra note 199, at 13 (indicating that the
Israeli government administers and funds both insurance programs).
204 See Security Council, supra note 200, at 21 (providing that Property Tax and
Compensation Fund is responsible for damage to both real and personal property); see
also Bolger, supra note 200, at 2 (providing that property loss due to war-like activities,
including terrorism, are covered by the fund); Rizzo, supra note 204, at 13 (indicating
Property Tax and Compensation Fund provides property and casualty insurance).
205 See Hillman testimony, supra note 33, at 8 (indicating that funds are generated
from a property tax levied primarily against businesses); Security Council, supra note
200, at 21-22 (designating tax on landowners in Israel is the source of funding). See
generally Rizzo, supra note 204, at 13 (indicating Property Tax and Compensation Fund
is funded through a national property tax on local businesses).
206 See Hillman testimony, supra note 33, at 8 (elucidating the means in which the
fund investigates claims and administers damages); see also Rizzo, supra note 204, at 13
(indicating Property Tax Commission is responsible for administering the claims arising
as the direct result of hostile terrorist acts). See generally Kunreuther, supra note 199, at
6 (noting that the Property Tax Commission is responsible for paying for property
damages).
207 See Hillman testimony, supra note 33, at 8 (indicating any indirect losses are to
be covered by private supplemental insurance, which is available to make up for the
difference, if any, between the amount of coverage the state provides and the cost of
replacing the property lost.); see also Rizzo, supra note 204, at 13 (positing Property Tax
Commission only pays claims arising as the direct result of hostile terrorist acts). See
generalyKunreuther, supra note 199, at 6 (stating that the fund will only compensate for
direct damages).
208 See Hillman testimony, supra note 33, at 8 (describing the agency regulations
regarding compensation); see also Evelyn Gordon, Scuds Send New Accounts Brink's'
Way, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 30, 1991, at 7 (stating that the fund often pays claimants
less then real value of destroyed property); Tal Muscal, Insurance Won't Cover Missile
Attack, JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 9, 2002, at 9 (noting the limitations of coverage under the
current system).
209 See Security Council, supra note 200, at 22 (detailing payments as a result of
Scud missile attacks); see also Muscal, supra note 208, at 9 (indicating that the
Commission generously compensated citizens after the 1991 Scud attacks); Alisa
Odenheimer, Compensation in Full for Missile-Hit Homes, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 11,
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made more than 15,000 payments for damages incurred by
Israeli citizens as a result of the Iraqi Scud Missile attacks.210
The Israeli government then subrogated those claims against the
Iraqi government in the United Nations. 211 It sought, and was
awarded, a recommended compensation amount in excess of $2
million U.S. dollars ("USD").212 This was necessary as the Gulf
War proved to b6 a great strain on the fund. In 1991, the fund
had to take a loan from the Israeli Treasury as it did not have
the requisite moneys to pay the claims pouring in due to the
conflict.2 13
The state also operates the other fund, the Compensation of
Victims of Enemy Action. 214 The National Insurance Institute
supervises the operation of this fund that covers life and health
insurance. 215 This too is financed by tax dollars, and 216 extends
1991, at 6 (indicating that the government of Israel compensates for damages done to
homes during missile attacks).
210 See Security Council, supra note 200, at 22 (explaining the role of the Property
Tax and Compensation Fund's role in aiding injured Israeli families after the Iraqi Scud
Missile Attacks); see also Asher Wallfish, Comptroller Asked to Probe War Compensation
Funds, JERUSALEM POST, June 18, 1991, at 01 (noting that some insurance funds paid
substantial amounts to victims of Scud Missile Attacks). See generally Asher Wallfish,
Toll of the Scuds So Far - 14 Dead, 273 Wounded, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 31, 1991, at 02
(stating the extensive casualties and injuries incurred by the Israeli people due to Iraqi
Scud Missile Attacks).
211 See Security Council, supra note 200, at 22 (stating how the fund replaced the
amounts paid to victims). See generally Kunreuther, supra note 199, at 6 (positing Israeli
insurance for terrorism victims as a model for United States insurance companies to
follow); Rizzo, supra note 204, at 13 (proposing a system for insurance against terrorism).
212 See Security Council, supra note 200, at 22 (stating this was for a claim made to
the United Nations Commission for $1 billion USD; of that amount, approximately $103
million (USD) were sought for property and personal damages for the attacks). See
generally Gordon, supra note 208, at 7 (describing the compensation to victims after the
Scud Missile Attacks); Wallfish, supra note 210, at 2 (relaying events after the 1991 Scud
Missile Attacks).
213 See Wallfish, supra note 210, at 01 (stating that fund wiped out due to war
damage and that loan needed to pay ever mounting claims); see also War Fears Cause
Dow Plunge, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 20, 2002, at 12A (showing that Israeli insurance
companies, having learned from the Gulf War how devastating war can be to the state of
Israel, are fearful of impending war). See generally Evelyn Gordon, Government to
Compensate Indirect Missile Casualties, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 31, 1991, at 02
(intimating that, although the funds were wiped out, many injured went uncompensated).
214 See Wallfish, supra note 210, at 01 (highlighting that the state subsidizes
insurance company for payments made to victims of enemy attack); see also Gordon,
supra note 213, at 02 (indicating that some of the wounded and dead would be covered by
the Compensation of Victims of Enemy Action Fund); Evelyn Gordon, Tough Treasury
Rules for Storm Compensation, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 15, 1992, at 02 (describing the way
the system works under certain circumstances).
215 See Hillman testimony, supra note 33, at 8 (discussing the coverage of the
Compensation of Victims of Enemy Action fund). See generally Gordon, supra note 213, at
02 (explaining how compensation for terrorist actions must be claimed); Gordon,
Government to Compensate Indirect Missile Casualties, supra note 213, at 02 (noting the
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to tourists and visitors to Israel as well as to citizens. 21 7
The two funds are deeply enmeshed in the culture of the State
of Israel. However, this is because of the ever-present state of
siege that surrounds the small nation. As seen by the above
outline, the largest drain has come from direct warlike activities,
which have been ongoing since the establishment of the state in
1948.218 Because of these conditions, Israel has been the only
country that needed to resort to a bail out of its reinsurance
system by the national government. 219
PLANS PRESENTED TO CONGRESS
After the tragedies of September 11, many agreed that the
government had to become involved in some manner to stabilize
the insurance sector. 220 This stabilization involved enabling the
insurance consumer to purchase insurance coverage necessary to
continue businesses that needed such coverage. The plans began
to sprout from all the usual suspects - the White House, the
House of Representatives, the Senate, the industry itself, as well
implementation of the compensation fund to aid victims of terrorist attacks).
216 See Hillman testimony, supra note 33, at 8 (explaining how the Compensation of
Victims of Enemy Actions Fund is financed). See generally Gordon, supra note 213, at 02
(discussing the financing of the Israeli relief funds); Gordon, Tough Treasury Rules for
Storm Compensation, supra note 214, at 02 (describing the contributions made to the
Israeli relief funds).
217 Hearing on Insurance and Terrorism Before Subcomm. On Capital Mkts., Ins.,
and Serv. Comm., supra note 33, at 8-9 (discussing coverage of the relief funds); But see
Gordon, supra note 213, at 02 (indicating that exactly who is covered by the fund is still
undetermined); Wallfish, supra note 210, at 01 (stating that the fund, due to inefficiencies
in the system, failed to pay out millions of dollars to qualified victims).
218 See Hillman testimony, supra note 33, at 8-9 (explaining the reason for Israel's
need for a fund designed to compensate victims of terrorism). See generally Joseph Curl,
Terrorism Insurance Bill Signed Into Law, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2002, at A03 (discussing
concerns that terrorism insurance funds would strain the economy); Edward Walsh,
House Passes Terrorism Insurance Bill: Senate to Take Up Measure Called Vital to
Economy, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2002, at A01 (stating that the terrorism insurance bill
signed into law by Congress was a compromise due to fears that it would drain tax
dollars).
219 See Hillman testimony, supra note 33, at 8-9 (noting the strain on Israel's
economy for instituting a fund for the relief of victims of terrorism); see also Gordon,
supra note 213, at 02 (noting that current insurance company's stocks have fallen due to
fears that similar effects on the industry will occur as they did during the Gulf War);
Wallfish, supra note 210, at 01 (noting that the Compensation of Victims of Enemy Action
fund was "wiped out" and necessitated a loan from the Treasury).
220 See An Insurance Market Overview: In the Wake of Disaster, 3d Update, THE
AON CORP., DEC. 10, 2001, at 13; see also Curl, supra note 218, at A03 (noting that the
insurance sector refused to insure deals which it felt would be risky investments due to
threat of terrorist attack); Walsh, supra note 218, at A01 (noting that businesses were
having difficulty finding "affordable terrorism insurance").
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as consumer groups and taxpayer groups. All groups presented
plans with different levels of governmental participation.2 2 1 The
one item all agreed upon was that there had to be one mutually
understood definition of terrorism itself.222 Also, agreed upon was
the need for one agency or person to make the determination of
whether in incident would be a labeled a terrorist attack.223
The Whi te House Plan
The plan developed by President George W. Bush's
administration was designed to give the insurance industry some
breathing room for the years directly following the September 11
attacks. The plan was not meant to be a continuing subsidy for
the industry, as it had a four-year shelf life.224 The plan was
unveiled on October 15, 2001.225
The Administration's plan was to begin on January 1, 2002 and
221 See An Insurance Market Overview: In the Wake of Disaster, supra note 220
(stating "All proposed structures recognize the terrorism exposure as a public policy issue
and differ more in the details of how the U.S. government pool concept would interface
with private insurance capacity than in the basic concept of government-back catastrophic
protection.") (emphasis added); see also Walsh, supra note 218, at A01 (noting the
different House versions that were discussed). See generally Curl, supra note 218, at A03
(discussing the fact that many lobbyists were against the bill).
222 See Curl, supra note 218, at A03 (noting that the insurance sector's reluctance to
insure million dollar building projects led to delays in construction and was a detriment to
the economy, which forced many companies to lobby the government to pass a
comprehensive plan to deal with the problem); see also Walsh, supra note 218, at A01
(stating that there was "considerable debate over the need for the government to
intervene in the insurance market"). See generally Special Bulletin, Bush Administration
Proposes Public-Private Partnership for Terrorism Insurance, Stroock & Stroock &
Lavan, LLP Oct. 15, 2001 (hereinafter "Stroock") (outlining definition of terrorism in the
Bush Administration's proposed plan for terrorism insurance).
223 See Walsh, supra note 218, at A01 (quoting Representative Michael G. Oxley,
House Financial Services Committee Chairman, as stating: "This bill is absolutely
necessary to the well-being of the American economy"); see also Curl, supra note 218, at
A03 (noting that the bill was passed with overwhelming bipartisan support). See
generally Stroock, supra note 222 (explaining who would make the determination of
whether an act would be deemed an act of terrorism for purposes of the insurance plan).
224 See Stroock, supra note 227 (explaining the machinations of the proposed plan);
see also Curl, supra note 218, at A03 (indicating that the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act is
limited to a "three year aftermath of an attack"); Walsh, supra note 218, at A01 (noting
that the plan is capped at $100 million over three years).
225 See David Pilla, Insurance Advocates "Encouraged" by White House Plan on
Terrorism Coverage, BESTWIRE, Oct. 15, 2001 (outlining preliminary ramifications of the
White House Plan); Michael Schroeder, Insurers Await Wite House Plan for Terrorism
Coverage, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2001, at B2 (anticipating the White House Plan to aid in
terrorism insurance); Takashi Yokota, Bush Proposes Terror Insurance Plan,
MARKETWATCH.COM, Oct. 15, 2001, at News & Commentary; Economy and Politics




sunset on December 31, 2005.226 The Bush plan gave the
Secretary of the Treasury the power to determine whether an
incident was termed a terrorist action.227 The plan's cornerstone
is the belief that the private industry would inevitably be able to
accurately and efficiently price terror coverage so that
government involvement would be unnecessary.228
The plan itself gradually decreases the amount of
governmental involvement during its lifetime. The first year
contemplates extensive government involvement with the private
sector responsible for 20% of the first $20 billion in losses.229 In
the second year, government responsibility is reduced as the
thought is that the industry will become more adept at pricing
such policies, and that it will be financially stronger to withstand
a significant blow.230 In the second year private insurers would
226 See Marilyn Geewax, White House Plan Would Help Pay Terrorism Claims, PALM
BEACH POST, Oct. 16, 2001, at 12A (indicating that the three-year White House Plan
would begin January 1, 2002); Maureen Lorenzetti, US. Energy Policy Outlook an
Enigma: In Wake of Terrorist Attacks, OIL & GAS J., Sept. 17, 2001, at 20 (stating that
the effective period for the White House Plan would begin after Dec. 31, 2001 and end
before Jan. 1, 2007); see also Pilla, supra note 225 (reiterating the 3-year intended term of
the White House Plan).
227 See Steven Brostoff, Insurers Work with Bush on Terrorism Coverage Plan,
NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Oct. 22, 2001, at 5 (explaining that under the plan, the Treasury
Secretary would certify whether a terrorist event had occurred); see also Dennis Kelly,
Latest Fed Proposal has Industry Paying irst $10 Billion of Future Terror Claims,
BESTWIRE, Oct. 29, 2001 (noting the Treasury Department's involvement in the White
House Plan); Richard W. Stevenson, WVuite House Asks Congress to Accelerate a Tax Cut,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2001, at A8 (showing the Treasury Department's proposals referring
to the White House Plan and its implementation).
228 See An Insurance Market Overview: In the Wake of Disaster, 3d Update, THE
AON CORP., Dec. 10, 2001, at 13 (proving that currently, the private market has begun to
make available such insurance from specialty insurers but at a most prohibitive price);
see also Stephen Labaton & Joseph B. Treaster, The Lobbying Insurers Push for Cap on
Future Payouts, N. Y. TIMES, at B7 (quoting Mr. Buffet, an insurance executive, stating
that only the government has the resources to aid the terrorism insurance industry);
Jean-Louis Poirier et al., PA Consulting Group's Analysis of the Bush National Energy
Policy Plan Predicts Positive Outcome for the U.S. Utility Industry, PR NEWSWIRE, May
29, 2001, at Washington Dateline (finding that the Bush plans do include significant
government intervention). See generally Karen Masterson, Focus Shifts to Homeland:
Congress Given Blueprint for New Department, Hous. CHRON., June 19, 2002, at A4
(questioning whether the new plan will result in an added cost to taxpayers).
229 Stroock, supra note 222, at 1 (outlining the intended coverage of the plan);see also
Brostoff, supra note 227, at 5 (explaining the intended 80% first year coverage by the
government in the first year); Kelly, supra note 227 (discussing the government's split on
insurance coverage in the first year, up to $100 billion, at 80%); Stephen Labaton &
Joseph B. Treaster, Bush Details Plan to Help Insurers on Future Terror Claims, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 16, 2001, at Cl (illustrating the government's coverage under the plan to be
80% of the initial $20 billion and then 90% of the next $80 billion in the first year).
230 See Brostoff, supra note 227, at 5 (contrasting the specifications of the plan for
the first and second year, from which one may infer that private insurers will be given
more responsibility); Kelly, supra note 227 (comparing the percentages of government
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be liable for 100% of the first $10 billion in losses.231 If losses
exceeded that amount, the insurers would be responsible for 50%
of losses over $10 billion up to $20 billion.232 If losses exceeded
$20 billion in the second year, the industry would be liable for
only 10% of that amount with the government picking up the
balance. 233
The third year would leave even greater monetary liability
with the industry. The insurers would be on the hook for the first
$20 billion in losses in their entirety.234 If the losses exceeded $20
billion but were below $40 billion, the private sector would share
the burden with the government in a 50-50 split.2 35 If damages
were greater than $40 billion, the government would takeover
90% of the liability and the insurers would be responsible for only
10%.236 In the entire three years of the program, the industry
does not have to pay any premiums to the government for such
services. 237 The government's reasoning behind this is that any
coverage for 2002 and 2003); Labaton & Treaster, supra note 229, at C1 (setting forth the
differences in the amount of insurance that private insurers would still be responsible for
in the years to come).
231 See Brostoff, supra note 227, at 5 (indicating that private insurers would cover
100% of the first $10 billion); Kelly, supra note 227 (reiterating the private and
government insurance loss coverage percentages for the first $10 billion); Labaton &
Treaster, supra note 229, at C1 (restating again the applicable coverage percentages for
private insurers and setting the liability cap at $23 billion in 2003).
232 See Brostoff, supra note 227, at 5 (explaining that private insurers would cover
50% of amounts over $10 billion and up to $20 billion); Kelly, supra note 227 (setting forth
the private and government insurance loss coverage percentages for the range between
losses of $10 billion and $20 billion); Labaton & Treaster, supra note 229, at C1 (stating
the applicable 2003 coverage limit is $23 billion).
233 See Brostoff, supra note 227, at 5 (illustrating that the government would cover
90% of losses exceeding $20 billion); Kelly, supra note 227 (restating the private and
government insurance loss coverage percentages after $20 billion in losses); Labaton &
Treaster, supra note 229, at C1 (limiting the liability cap at $23 billion for 2003).
234 See Brostoff, supra note 227, at 5 (noting that private insurers would cover 100%
of the first $20 billion); Kelly, supra note 227 (making clear the private and government
insurance loss coverage percentages for the first $20 billion); Labaton & Treaster, supra
note 229, at C1 (stating the government would not cover any of the first $20 billion in
loss).
235 See Brostoff, supra note 227, at 5 (highlighting that the coverage after the first
$20 billion and up to $40 billion would be split evenly between private insurers and the
government); Kelly, supra note 227 (placing the coverage ratio at 50/50 for both the
government and private insurers); Labaton & Treaster, supra note 229, at C1 (reiterating
the applicable 2004 coverage limit is $36 billion).
236 See Brostoff, supra note 227, at 5 (commenting that the coverage exceeding $40
billion would be 10% by private insurers); Kelly, supra note 227 (clarifying that the
government would be responsible for 90% of the losses); Labaton & Treaster, supra note
229, at C1 (extrapolating that the applicable 2004 coverage limit is $36 billion).
237 See Sue Kirchhoff, Aid for Insurers Proposed U.S. Would Assume Portion of
Losses Tied to Terrorism, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 16, 2001, at D2 (discussing the insurance
association's proposed plan, but concluding that the government would adopt its own
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increase in premiums the insurers would be called on to pay
would be passed to the insurance consumer. 238 Inevitably, all
persons would feel the governmental premiums, as businesses
forced to pay the increased amounts would pass that on to their
customers. It would cause an inflationary spiral. The motive for
the government's involvement is to thwart such rate increases
and reduce the effect this tragedy has on the American economy
and the world.239
Ho use of Represen ta tives
The House plan was the Terrorism Risk Protection Act.2 40 As
in the administration's plan, the Secretary of the Treasury would
be in charge of overseeing the House's plan. 241 The plan is to
extend through January 1, 2003.242 The program can be
proposed plan, which simply included percentage coverage by private insurers and not
premiums); see also David Pilla & Dennis Kelly, Terrorism Insurance Pool Planned:
Proposed Tax Policy to Benefit Insurers, BEST'S REVIEW, Nov. 1, 2001, at 10 (reporting the
"preliminary plan" which included no premiums for private insurers, but only percentage
liabilities); Jackie Spinner, Insurers Say White House Plan Doesn't Spread Risk, WASH.
POST, Oct. 23, 2001, at A06 (setting forth the payment plan as proposed by the
government, which includes only liability ratio for private insurers to government
coverage).
238 See Ted Bunker, Insurance Fix is Threat to Taxpayer, BOSTON HERALD, Oct. 29,
2001, at 023 (positing the concept that Congress should act to prevent consumers from
being forced to pay higher property insurance); see also Amon Cohen, To Fly or not to
Fly?: After Last Week's Attacks on New York and Washington, Travelers Face a Mix of
Fear and Frustration; Some May Decide to Stay at Home, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 18,
2001, at 16 (positing that consumers already do not like air fare hikes). See generally
Labaton & Treaster, supra note 229, at 1 (explaining that the funding at some level must
come from the consumers, and that consumers and the industry want affordable
coverage).
239 See Daniel Aronowitz, Special to the National Law Journal, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 29,
2002, at A13 (discussing the gathering of top business leaders in the White House and
certain capital projects that have been stalled due to the lack of available insurance
against terrorism); Deirdre Davidson, Leaders Gave Insurers'Fight for Coverage Stronger
Focus, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 27, 2002, at 4 (discussing the role business leaders
and President Bush took in getting insurance legislation passed to help the economy); see
also Joseph G. Finnerty & Eric S. Connuck, Sept. 11th: What is the Impact on the
Insurers N.Y.L.J., Nov. 26, 2001, at 1 (noting the tightening insurance market and how
some insurers will decrease their coverage or increase their premiums).
240 Terrorism Risk Protection Act, H.R. 3210, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (2001).
241 See id. at § 3 (stating "the Secretary of the Treasury shall be responsible for
carrying out a program for financial assistance for commercial property and casualty
insurers, as provided in this Act"); Anthony J. Sebok, Sneaky Tort Reform, NAT.'L L.J.,
Jan. 14, 2002, at A21 (noting the Secretary of the Treasury will determine what is an "Act
of Terrorism"); see also Karen J. Sibayan, Market Waits After Terror Bill is Passed,
ASSET SECURITIZATION REPORT, Nov. 25, 2002 (discussing how the Secretary of State and
the Attorney General will assist the Secretary of the Treasury in determining when an act
of terrorism occurs).
242 H.R. 3210, supra note 240, at §20(a).
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extended,243 however, Congress must be informed of that fact and
the reasons for the extension. 244 The plan called for the insurers
to submit to the Secretary the amount of premiums they have
written for the period the Secretary specifies.245 The plan also
specified what event would trigger it into action. The
determination that an act of terror has happened was to be made
by the Secretary. 246 Of utmost importance was the section that
lays out the definition of terror. 247 This was important as it gave
243 See id. at §20(b) (empowering the Secretary to extend the program for a period
not in excess of two years); Dennis Kelly, Federally Backed Reinsurance Loan Program
Passes House Committee, BESTWIRE, Nov. 8, 2001 (noting Congress' ability to extend
Act); Dennis Madison, Terror Bill is Put Back Again, POST MAG., Nov. 8, 2001, at 13
(discussing extension clause in House version of the Terror Act).
244 See H.R. 3210, supra note 240, at §20(c) (stating "the Secretary may exercise the
authority under subsection (a) to extend the applicability of this Act to 2003 or 2004 only
if the Secretary submits a report to the Congress providing notice of and setting forth the
reasons for such extension for such specific year); see also H.R. 3210, supra note 240,
Amendment No. 1, (amendment offered by Mr. Bentsen), available at
http://fmancialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/hr321011.pdf (Nov. 6, 2001) (highlighting
amendment that requires a report to be sent to Congress for such extension year);
Mortgage Bankers Association of America, House Financial Services Committee Passes
Terrorism Insurance Legislation, available at http://www.mbaa.org/industry/news/01l/
1107a.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2003) (noting Mr. Bentsen's Amendment requiring
program administrator to report back to Congress for an extension).
24 5 See H.R. 3210, supra note 240, at § 4 (specifying that the net premium amount of
coverage written by such insurer under each line of "commercial property and casualty
insurance sold by such insurer during such period as the Secretary may provide"); see also
Committee on Financial Services, H.R. Rep. No. 107-300, pt. 1, at 30 (2001) (recognizing
the fact that some of this information is already available through state agencies, but
giving the Secretary the independent power to require it directly from insurance
companies). See generally House Passes Baker-Sponsored Terrorism Insurance
Legislation, available at httpA/www.mbaa.orgindustry/news/01/1107a.html (last visited
Apr. 13, 2003) (noting insurer's duty to submit claims information as a consumer
protection).
246 See H.R. 3210, supra note 240, at § 5(a) (explaining the means in which it will be
determined whether an act of terror has occurred in order to trigger the Act); see also
H.R. 3210, supra note 240, at §5(b) (allowing the Secretary to consult with the Attorney
General and the Secretary of State but unequivocally keeping the determination in the
hands of the Treasury Secretary); Sebok, supra note 241, at A21 (noting the Secretary of
the Treasury will determine what is an "act of terrorism").
247 Requirements. An act meets the requirements of this subparagraph if the act -
(i) is unlawful;
(ii) Causes harm to a person, property, or entity, in the United States or in the case of
a domestic United States air carrier or a United States flag vessel, in or outside the
United States;
(iii) Is committed by a person or group of persons or association who are recognized,
either before or after such act, by the Department of State or the Secretary as an
international terrorist group or have conspired with such a group or the group's
agents or surrogates;
(iv) Has as its purpose to overthrow or destabilize the government of any country, or
to influence the policy or affect the conduct of the government of the United States or
any segment of the economy of the United States, by coercion; and
(v) Is not considered an act of war, except that this clause shall not apply with respect
to any coverage for workers compensation.
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all involved, insurers, insured and the government a mutual
basis to begin to calculate the risks and the coverage needed. 248
The plan had two triggers, one for the entire industry and the
other for individual insurers. If these triggers were met, the
House plan went into action and made loans available to the
insurers.249 The industry-wide trigger arose when losses exceed
$1 billion.250 The individual insurer trigger occurred when losses
exceeded $100 million and the insurer's losses were greater than
10% of its capital surplus and 10% of its net premiums. 251
In the industry-wide situation, the assistance available to the
industry was set within particular parameters. Assistance was
available to each insurer in an amount equal to the difference
between 90% of insured losses and $5 million.252 In the individual
insurer scenario, loans were made available in an amount equal
to 90% of insured losses and 10% of net premiums written.253
See H.R. 3210, supra note 240, at §16(B). There are different meanings of the word
"terror" as it applies to the House bill. See John H. Fitzhugh, Congress Must Act on
Losses From Terrorism, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Dec. 14, 2001, at B-07. The National
Association of Insurance Commissioners also has its own definition of "terror." See
Kendall, supra note 50, at 589.
248 See Kendall, supra note 50, at 588 (discussing definition of terrorism in
exclusions); see also Stempel, supra note 64, at 863 (analyzing war and terrorism
exclusions and their justifications based on these events changing actuarial predictions
and human behavior). See generally Joseph B. Treaster, The Race to Predict Terror's
Cost, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 1, 2001, at Abstracts 1 (discussing difficulty in assessing the
probability of terror attacks and their dollar value).
249 See H.R. 3210, supra note 240, at §5 (explaining the different "trigger
determinations" under the House proposal); see also Daniel Aronowitz, A Federal Solution
for Terrorism Insurance, MIAMI DAILY Bus. REV., May 6, 2002, at A19 (discussing House
proposal and its triggers for coverage and criticizing the proposal as not providing enough
coverage); Mark A. Hoffmann, Hopes High for Terror Bill: Industry Confident as
Conferees Return, Bus. INS., Sept. 2, 2002, at 1 (contrasting Senate and House proposals,
which would requires losses to exceed $1 billion for the industry to trigger reimbursement
or $100 million for an individual insurer).
250 H.R. 3210, supra note 240, at §5(a)(1).
251 See id. at § 5(a)(2)(A) & (B) (explaining triggers); see also Hofmann, supra note
249, at 1 (noting House's proposed triggers). See generally Mark A. Hoffmann & Rodd
Zolkos, Terror Bill Draws Praise, Criticism: Insurance Industry Seeks Changes, Bus.
INS., Dec. 3, 2001, at 1 (discussing limits and triggers of House proposal).
252 See H.R. 3210, supra note 240, at § 6(b)(1) (stating "the amount of financial
assistance made available under this section to each commercial insurer shall be equal to
ninety percent of the amount of the insured losses of the insurer as a result of the
triggering event involved"); see also Mark A. Hoffmann & Robert Ceniceros, Lukewarm
Response to House Plan to Offer Loans for Terrorism Losses, BUS. INS., Nov. 12, 2001, at
3 (noting how insurers will still keep 10% of losses due to the 90% cap); Lynda Sears,
State Rule on Terrorism: While the Federal Government drags its Feet on Implementing
a Federal Terrorism Backstop, States are Making Their Own Decisions About Terrorism
Exclusions, RISK & INS., May 1, 2002, at 20 (summarizing limitations on House proposal).
253 See H.R. 3210 at § 6(b)(2) (describing the breakdown of loans made to insurers);
see also Hoffiman & Zolkos, supra note 251, at 1 (noting maximum amount covered by
government loans under House bill); Hoffman & Ceniceros, supra note 252, at 3
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Congress capped the total amount available under the Act for all
occurrences at $100 billion.254 If the situation called for funds in
excess of that amount, the issue went to Congress for full review
by that body.255
The House further stipulated the amount of money to be repaid
by the insurance companies if a triggering event occurred. 256 The
amount would be the lesser of $20 billion or the amount of
financial assistance paid under the plan. 257 The plan further
makes allowances for delayed imposition of repayment when
multiple triggering determinations occur.258
If, after a triggering event occurred, and the Secretary
determined that the amount of assistance exceeded $20 billion,
the Secretary would weigh several factors259 before settling upon
(identifying percentage of loans made available to individual insurers).
254 See H.R. 3210 at § 6(c)(1) (identifying Congress' cap available under the Act); see
also Steve Davis, Risk of Terrorism Leaves Some Companies Uninsurable, PESTICIDE &
ToXIc CHEMICAL NEWS, Feb. 25, 2002 at 19 (outlining features of Terrorism Risk
Protection Act to note maximum amount to be available under Act); Martha Neil,
Terrorism Insurance Bailout Stalls in Congress, 1 ABA J. EREPORT 17 (2002), at In The
News (discussing House and Senate plans for insurance problems after 9/11 and noting
limitation on federal spending under House's Terrorism Risk Protection Act).
255 See H.R. 3210 at § 6(c)(2) (declaring "it is the sense of Congress that acts of
terrorism resulting in insured losses greater than $100,000,000,000 would necessitate
further action by the Congress to address such additional losses"); see also Davis, supra
note 254, at 19 (noting Congressional review for losses over $100 billion dollars); Shailagh
Murray et al., Terror-Insurance Bill is Approved by House, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2002, at
A4 (noting when Congress will review claims).
256 See H.R. 3210 at § 7 (describing triggering events that would require insurance
companies to pay out); see also Murray et al., supra note 255, at A4 (explaining payment
plans set out for insurance companies); David Winston, Terrorism Risk Legislation,
ADVISOR TODAY, Jan. 1, 2002, at 60 (discussing how insurance company liability would
follow under House bill).
257 See H.R. 3210 at § 7(b) (announcing the amounts that would be paid by the
insurance companies in the event of a triggering event). See generally Stephen Labaton,
House Votes to Sueld Insurers and Limit Suits by Future Terror Victims, N. Y. TIMES,
Nov. 30, 2001, at B8 (discussing provisions regarding loan allocation); Christian Murray,
Insurers Seek Protection from Terrorism Congress Crafts Bills to Help Industry, but
Many Unsure if Laws Will Benefit Them, NEWSDAY, Nov. 4, 2001, at F02 (discussing
what amounts insurers would receive in government loans).
258 See H.R. 3210 at § 7(c)(3) (discussing the ramifications of multiple triggering
events). See generally Dennis Kelly, First Federal Reinsurance Plans Calls for Loans and
Not a Pool, BEST'S INS. NEWS, Nov. 1, 2001 (discussing House plan); Murray et al., supra
note 255, at A4 (outlining House plan).
259 The Factors under the paragraph are -
(A) the ultimate cost to taxpayers if a surcharge under this section is not established;
(B) the economic conditions of the commercial marketplace;
(C)the affordability of commercial insurance for small- and medium-sized business;
and
(D) such other factors as the Secretary considers appropriate.
See H.R. 3210 at § 8(a)(2) Factors.
Under the bill the "Treasury secretary has flexibility in determining assessments and
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the amount of a policyholder premium needed to repay the
amount of federal assistance. 260 The amount and duration of the
policyholder premium was at the discretion of the Secretary,261
subject to a limitation of 3% of the premium charged for the
coverage. 262 The plan also established the manner in which the
assessment of repayment plans and any applicable surcharges
are administered. 263
This plan was contrary to the administration's plan in that
there was a cost for the government's involvement, though it was
set at a very moderate level.264 The costs to which the industry is
beholden is a modest $1 billion.265 As set forth previously, this
was but a miniscule amount for a robust industry whose assets
run into the trillions of dollars. However, the significance of the
legislation was that it presented a comprehensive plan whereby
the insurance industry was aware of the support and its finite
time span. It gave the industry the needed stabilization after
such a shocking event as September 11. It allowed the industry
surcharges" based on the above listed factors. See Dennis Kelly, Terror, Mold, and More:
Terrorism Reinsurance Pool Sought, BEST'S INS. NEWS, Dec. 31, 2001. The bill allows the
Treasury secretary great leverage in deciding the amounts of assistance. See Labaton,
supra note 257, at B8.
260 See H.R. 3210 at § 8(a)(3) (noting the Secretary's ability to enable repayment of
the assistance); see also Dennis Kelly, House Passes Terrorism Reinsurance Bill: Senate
Action Awaited, BESTWIRE, Nov. 30, 2001 (outlining details of Terrorism Risk Protection
Act); Kelly, supra, note 259, (discussing Secretary's role under Act).
261 See H.R. 3210 at § 8(b) (providing for Secretary's discretion under the bill); Kelly,
supra note 259 (discussing when Secretary may review claims under Terrorism Risk
Protection Act); Labaton, supra note 257, at B8 (noting Secretary's power to review
amounts in excess of $20 billion in determining premiums).
262 See H.R. 3210 at § 8(c) (noting the 3% limitation); see also Hoffman & Zolkos,
supra, note 251, at 1 (explaining 3% surcharge maximum applied to loans under House
Bill); Hoffman & Ceniceros, supra note 252, at 3 (noting surcharge limitation as proposed
in House bill).
263 See H.R. 3210 at § 9 (explaining the administration of repayment plans and
surcharges); see also Murray et al., supra note 255, (detailing plan specifications on
repayment). See generally Michael Schroeder & Chris Oster, Insurers Send Out
Cancellation Warnings as Terror-Protection Bill Stalls m Congress, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13,
2001, at A24 (summarizing House bill proposals).
264 See Jackie Spinner, White House Offers Insurance Plan: US. Would Pay Up to
90% of Claims from Future Terrorist Attacks, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 2001, at A05
(outlining White House plan). See generally Hoffman & Zolkos, supra note, 251, at 1
(contrasting differences between White House and House bills); Michael Schroeder, Bush
Plan for Terrorism Insurance Faces Challenge from the Right, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 2001,
at A2 (summarizing White House plan).
265 See Winston, supra note 256, at 60 (comparing House and Senate insurance plans
after 9/11). See generally Kelly, supra note 259 (highlighting industry wide maximum
amount under the Terrorism Risk Protection Act). But see Aronowitz, supra note 249, at
A19 (criticizing flaws in House bill for not protecting insurance companies and for not
preventing insurance companies to "price terrorism based on risk").
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time to accurately set prices, while not leaving insurance
consumers, especially business, without coverage. 266
Senate
The Senate plan was the "National Terrorism Reinsurance
Fund Act."267 The focus of the Act was to temporarily support the
private property and casualty insurance market until it was
capable of adequately providing insurance to consumers. 268 The
Fund was to exist for three years.269 The administration of the
Act was to fall within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of
Commerce. 270 The Secretary was to make the determination of
whether an incident was an act of terrorism.2 71 The Act
enunciated a set definition of terrorism. 272 The Secretary was to
266 See Stephen Brill, Married to Jihad, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 14, 2002, at 50 (explaining
benefits of House bill to insurers and businesses); see also Kelly, supra note 259 (noting
benefits to House plan). See generally, Stephen Labaton, House Committee Approves
Measure to Aid Insurance Industry in Terrorist Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2001 at B7
(quoting Representative Michael G. Oxley discussing how individuals would receive
coverage under House plan).
267 National Terrorism Reinsurance Fund Act, S. 1743, 107th Cong. (2001).
268 See id at §3 (designating the Congressional purpose of the Act); see also
Statement of Senator Hollings, Introduction of the National Terrorism Reinsurance Act,
S. 1743, 107th Cong, available at http://www.senate.gov/-commerce/legis/sl743efhstm.
pdf (asserting that the Act will provide temporary relief for losses due to terrorism
suffered by primary insurance companies); Marla Misek, The Legislation Lag, LODGING
MAG., available at http://www.lodgingnews.com/lodgingmag/2002-05/2002-05-27.asp (last
visited Apr. 13, 2003) (stating that legislation is needed to further protect taxpayers,
policyholders, and insurers in the event of subsequent terrorist attacks).2 6 9 See S. 1743, supra note 267, at §13(b) (maintaining that the Fund will terminate
on December 31, 2004, unless the Secretary of Commerce decides to terminate prior to
that date); see also Thomas A. Player, A Global Defimition of Terrorism, FORC Q. J. OF
INS. LAW & REG. available at http://www.nlc.org/nlc-org/journalfall02Player2.pdf
(reaffirming the three year time limit on operation of the Fund). See generally Congress
Passes Terrorism Reinsurance Act, available at http'/www.nlc.orgnlc-org/site/
newsroom/nationscities-weekly/display.cfm?id=E8E90EAO-CO4C-45B888BDFFE46B 148
2B2 (last visited Apr. 13, 2003) (discussing the structure and time limitations of the
Fund).
270 See S. 1743, supra note 267, at §4(a) (directing the administration of the Fund to
the Secretary of Commerce); see also S. 1743, supra note 267, at §11 (describing the
province of the Secretary of Commerce under the Act); Player, supra note 269 (stressing
that the Secretary of Commerce is one of two persons responsible for deeming an event an
act of terrorism).
271 See S. 1743, supra note 267, at §7 (positing the Secretary is to give public notice
of such a determination and allow all interested parties a chance to be heard on the
matter); see also S. 1743, supra note 267, at §7(b). See generally Player, supra note 269
(noting that the Secretary of the Treasury may also declare an event an act of terrorism).
272 In general the term "terrorism" and "act of terrorism" mean any act, certified by
the Secretary in concurrence with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, as a
violent act or act dangerous to human life, property or infrastructure, within the United
States, its territories and possessions, that is committed by an individual or individuals
acting on behalf of foreign agents or foreign interests (other than a foreign government) as
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select an advisory committee consisting of ten persons from
various interest groups. 2 73
The Fund was to be established by the Secretary without
monetary limitation imposed upon a yearly basis. 274 The fund
was to have a $5 million administration budget for each year of
its existence. 275 The Fund's financing arose from fees, premiums,
interest on investments, and funds borrowed from the Treasury
Department. 276 In determining the correctness of terrorism rates
part of an effort to coerce or intimidate the civilian population of the United States or to
influence the policy or affect the conduct of the United States government. See S. 1743,
supra note 267, at §14(8)(A). Nation-states do not commit acts of terrorism. See generally
Tim Weiner, Terrorism's Worldwide Toll Was High in 1996, U.S. Report Says, N.Y.
TIMES, May 1, 1997, at A9. The act of terrorism must itself be attributable to a person or
party. See generally Leslie Maitland Werner, An Agency Steps Out of Obscurity, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 27, 1985, at §4 pg. 22.
273 The advisory committee shall consist of 10 members, as follows:
(1) 3 representatives of the property and casualty insurance industry, appointed by
the Secretary.
(2) A representative of property and casualty insurance agents, appointed by the
Secretary.
(3) A representative of consumers of property-casualty insurance, appointed by the
Secretary.
(4) A representative of a recognized national credit rating agency, appointed by the
Secretary.
(5) A representative of the banking or real estate industry, appointed by the
Secretary.
(6) 2 representatives of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners,
designated by that organization.
(7) A representative of the Department of the Treasury, designated by the Secretary
of the Treasury.
See S. 1743, supra note 267, at §4(b). The section further states that the purpose of the
Advisory Committee is to provide advice and counsel to the Secretary of Commerce in
administration of his/her reinsurance program. See S. 1743, supra note 267, at §4(b). The
functions and structure of the Advisory Committee are intricate. See generally Summary
The National Terrorism Insurance Act, available at http://www.senat.gov/-commerce/
legis/sl743sum.pdf.
274 See S. 1743, supra note 267, at §4(c)(2) (asserting the uses to which the Fund may
be directed); see also S. 1743, supra note 267, at §4(c)(1)(B) (limiting the administrative
expenses of operation of the Fund to $5,000,000 per the fiscal years 2002, 2003, and
2004); Player, supra note 269 (arguing that property loss must exceed $5 million before
qualifying for potential aid from the Fund).2 75 See S. 1743, supra note 267, at §4(c)(B) (placing an upper limit on administrative
expenses at $5 million); see also S. 1743, supra note 267, at §5(c)(1) (noting that the
Secretary of Commerce may borrow funds from the Treasury to satisfy the obligations of
the Fund if the balance in the Fund is insufficient). But see Marla Misek, Hedging
Against the Unthinkable - and Unknowable, LODGING MAG., available at
http://www.lodgingnews.com/lodgingmag/2002_05/2002-05-07.asp (last visited Apr. 13,
2003) (suggesting different avenues of insurance coverage for terrorist attacks).
276 See S. 1743, supra note 267, at §4(c)(2) (listing the sources of capital that are
deposited into the Fund); see also S. 1743, supra note 267, at §5(b)(1) (asserting that the
Fund will have an initial capital of $2 billion which is borrowed from the Treasury). See
generally Congress Passes Terrorism Reinsurance Act, supra note 269 (positing that the
total aid available from the Fund will exceed $100 billion).
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charged, the Commerce Secretary was to establish a special
committee on rates 277 as well as set minimum underwriting
standards27 8 to ensure the policies issued were not taking
unnecessary risks.27 9
Participating insurers send their designated fund premiums
quarterly. 280 The actual fee amount was set as a minimum of "not
less than 3 percent" of the total amount of premiums received for
that particular year.2 81 The Fund's start-up capital was to come
from the Treasury in the form of a loan.282 If the Fund's assets
277 See S. 1743, supra note 267, at §4(e)(1) (describing the make-up of the
committee); see also S. 1743, supra note 267, at §4(e)(2) (discussing the three duties of the
committee). See generally Christian Murray, Business Lauds Insurance Bill; Terror Aid
Seen as Economic Boost, NEWSDAY, Nov. 27, 2002, at A27 (arguing that insurance rates
were rising before the terrorist attacks and will continue to do so).
278 See S. 1743, supra note 267, at §4(d) (directing the Secretary to set minimum
underwriting standards for participating insurers). See generally Anthony Hughes, More
Insurance Pain on the Way, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Feb. 26, 2002, at 24 (arguing that
better underwriting standards are needed in the wake of terrorist attacks); Matthew
Lubanko, Insurance Costs Soaring: Sept. 11th Only Part of the Reason, HARFORD
COURANT, Feb. 24, 2002, at L10 (remarking on the general acceptance of tighter
underwriting standards in the professional arena).
279 See The Future of Insuring Terrorism Risks: Before the Senate Comm. On
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 107th Cong. (2001) (testimony of David A. Moss,
Associate Professor, Harvard Business School) (arguing that the Federal government
should be involved in the management of terror-related risks). See generally The Future
of Insuring Terrorism Risks: Before the Senate Comm. On Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, 107th Cong. (2001) (testimony of Diane Koken, Commissioner of
Insurance for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, National Association of Insurance
Commissioners) (outlining a proposal for the Federal government's role in insurance
against terror attacks). But see The Future of Insuring Terrorism Risks: Before the
Senate Comm. On Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 107th Cong. (2001) (testimony
of David L. Keating, Senior Counselor, National Taxpayers Union) (contending that
insurance companies may underwrite more risk for the government than they normally
would for themselves).
280 See S. 1743, supra note 267, at §5(a)(1) (disclosing the participation requirements
for insurers that wish to utilize the Fund); see also S. 1743, supra note 267, at §5(a)(2)
(declaring that the Secretary may charge an additional credit risk premium based on the
participant insurer's credit rating); S. 1743, supra note 267, at §5(b)(2) (insisting that the
premiums received by the Secretary from the participant insurer will be used to repay the
starting loan of the Fund).
281 See S. 1743, supra note 267, at §5(a)(1); see also Heidi A. Lawson, Insurance
Regulation: The Effects of September 11th, 673 PLI/LIT 53, 68 (2002) (stating that
insurance companies participating in the plan pay 3% of their gross direct premiums to
fund the pool but may pass on the cost to policyholders); Jay L. Paxton, Insurance and
Commercial Leases: Critical Provisions in Uncertain Times, 486 PLI/REAL 749, 756 (2002)
(stating that under the House and Senate Bills, the Federal Government would indirectly
collect a portion of premiums paid by insurers to reinsurance companies).
282 See S. 1743, supra note 267, at § 5(b) (discussing the means to start the Fund);
see also Carl J. Pernicone & James T. H. Deaver, Insurance Implications of the World
Trade Center Disaster, 31-SPG BRIEF 23, 24 (2002) (stating that the Senate plan enables
the Secretary of Treasury to cover insurance costs that exceed the Fund's threshold limit).
See generally S. Foster, American Inquiry into Contemporary Terrorist Accountability, 6
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 513, 524-25 (2002) (suggesting recourse for victims of September
11th by having the Treasury Department freeze foreign assets to pay judgments against
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proved less than its current needs, the Act empowered the
Commerce Secretary to borrow such funds from the Treasury as
were necessary to meet its liabilities.83 The Act capped the
amount of such loans at $50 billion over the Fund's assets. 284
The Fund provides coverage for terrorism losses covered by
reinsurance treaties between members of the fund and the Fund
itself.2 85 Insurers retain a specific amount of the risk involved
with each policy.286 The amount is set at ten percent of the
insurers total premiums. 287 The type of coverage provided by the
Fund is reinsurance between the insurer and the Fund in the
form of reimbursements for paid claims to insureds.288 The
terrorists).
283 See S. 1743, supra note 267, at §5(c)(1) (discussing ways for the Fund to meet its
liabilities); see also Lawson, supra note 281, at 68 (stating that the fund automatically
expires in 2004). See generally Gregg J. Loubier & Jason B. Aro, Insuring the Risks of
Terror: Questions of the Cost and Application of Terror Insurance Remain Open, 25-AUG
L.A. LAW. 18, 21 (2002) (stating that a new Federal Reserve Board study has found that
although terrorism coverage has had high costs, it has had "little or no" effect on the
demand for loans financing large financial projects).
284 See S. 1743, supra note 267, at § 5(c)(3) (discussing caps provided by the Act); see
also Lawson, supra note 281, at 69 (stating that after the $50 billion mark had been
reached, cost-sharing arrangements between insurers and the government would cover
the next $50 billion); James G. Rizzo, Tragedy's Aftermath: The Impact of 9/11 on the
Insurance Industry, 46-FEB B. B.J. 10, 15 (stating that in the case of another terrorist
attack, under the House version of the Bill, the Treasury Department can determine how
much assistance it will provide to the insurance industry).
285 See S. 1743, supra note 267, at §6(a) (explaining coverage of the Fund); see also
Loubier & Aro, supra note 283, at 18 (stating that the insurance industry lobbied the
federal government for assistance without which, insurance for real estate vulnerable to
terrorism could never be covered affordably). See generally Pernicone & Deaver, supra
note 282, at 27-28 (discussing some of the reinsurance implications in the wake of the
WTC attacks).
286 See S. 1743, supra note 267, at §6(b) (discussing risk-retention of insurers); see
also Loubier & Aro, supra note 283, at 18 (stating that it is impossible to quantify risk
models for catastrophes like September lth because they are entirely unpredictable). See
generally Steve Bergsman, Drowning in Insurance Costs?, J. OF PROP. MGMT., Jan. 1,
2002, at 24 (stating that major problem with terrorism from an insurance perspective is
that traditional risk mechanisms do not work).
287 See S. 1743, supra note 267, at §6(b) (explaining amounts set by the Fund); see
also Jennifer Heldt Powell, 9/11: One Year Later, BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 4, 2002, at 034
(observing that the fall in insurers' investments in the stock market has contributed to
the rise in insurance premiums). See generally Look, No Umbrella - Terrorist Insurance,
ECONOMIST, Sept. 7, 2002, (stating that new risk models are emerging in the private
sector by insurance advisory firms).
288 See S. 1743, supra note 267, at §6(c) (explaining the nature of the coverage by the
Fund); see also Winston, supra note 256, at 60 (stating that major difference between the
House and Senate plan is that the House plan provides federal loan assistance to
insurance companies while the Senate plan would not require the government to be
reimbursed by the insurance companies). See generally Kendall, supra note 50, at 579-80
(stating that although the relationship between insurers and reinsurers functioned
symbiotically prior to the attacks, September 11th has exposed the shortcomings of this
arrangement, which has broken down the system because reinsurers have refused to
cover acts of terrorism).
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amount of the reimbursement varies from year-to-year depending
upon the percentage of premiums that the insurers cede to the
Fund.289
The Act called for the Secretary to measure the availability of
private sector terror insurance on an annual basis.290 If the
situation appears rectified whereby the fund is no longer
necessary, the Secretary can dissolve it.291 The funds remaining
are distributable to insurers in proportion to the premiums
paid.292 Furthermore, the Act has a sunset provision written into
289 A percentage of its covered losses in calendar years beginning after year 2002
equal to -
(A) 90 percent if the insurer pays an assessment equal to 4 percent of the insurer's
average gross direct written premiums and policyholders' surplus for the most
recently ended calendar year;
(B) 80 percent if the insurer pays an assessment equal to 3 percent of the insurer's
average gross direct written premiums and policyholders' surplus for the most
recently ended calendar year; and
(C) 70 percent if the insurer pays an assessment equal to 2 percent of the insurer's
average gross direct written premiums and policyholders' surplus for the most
recently ended calendar year.
See S. 1743, supra note 267, §6(c)(2). Under the plan, government aid kicks in when losses
from terrorism exceed the minimum levels of the insurer's premiums. The threshold
levels are 7% in the first year 10 % in the second and 15 % in the third. See Edward
Walsh, Two More Senate Victories for Bush: Terrorism Insurance Bill and Controversial
Appellate Court Nominee Are Approved, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2002, at A05. Some
Congressional conservatives feared that subsidizing for insurance companies would create
an entitlement. See generally Politics & Policy of the Uninsured: WSJ Reports on New
Push for Solutions, AM. HEALTH LINE Volume 6 No. 9, Oct. 26, 2001.
290 See S. 1743, supra note 267, at §13(c) (detailing the responsibilities of the
Secretary); see also Stempel, supra note 64, at 867 n. 183 (stating that under the Senate
Bill, if losses exceed the $100 billion cap, then Congress may respond by determining a
cost-sharing arrangement). See generally Rick Rothacker, Lawmakers Work on
Terrorism-Related Assistance for Insurance Industry, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Oct. 31,
2001, (stating that a concern in deciding which federal plan to implement was making
sure that the private sector insurance industry did not remain too reliant on government
assistance).
291 See S. 1743, supra note 267, at §13(b) (outlining the means by which the
Secretary may dissolve the Fund); see also On Terrorism Insurance, US. Senate Has
Right Idea, NEWSDAY, June, 20, 2002, at A38 (stating that if losses are more than $100
billion, then the Secretary of the Treasury decides what further measures to take). See
generally Jesse J. Holland, Terror Insurance Plan Nears Agreement, DESERET NEWS, Oct.
18, 2002, at A05 (stating that the plan would allow the secretary the discretion to require
insurance companies to repay the government).
292 See S. 1743, supra note 267, at §13(d) (stating how the remaining funds would be
distributed); see also Jay L. Paxton, Insurance and Commercial Leases: Critical
Provisions in Uncertain Times, 486 PLI/REAL 749, 756 (2002) (stating that the
government collects a portion of the insurance premium paid by the insurer to establish a
reinsurance fund). See generally Annemarie Sedore, War Risk Exclusions in the 21st
Century Applying War Risk Exclusions to the Attacks of September 11th, 82 B.U. L. REV.
1041, 1060 (2002) (recognizing that insurance companies are raising their premiums to
recoup losses in response to September I1th and may even earn more than if they paid all
September 11th claims).
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the legislation causing it to terminate on a set date in 2004.293
This measure effectively makes the government the insurer of
last resort as in the United Kingdom's Pool Re. The insurance
companies would pay into the fund to establish the ability to
draw upon it for losses in excess of the proscribed amounts.294
The variation is that it is set-up for a finite time period. This
along with the section on the return of unused funds to the
insurance companies show that it is specifically a temporary
solution.295 The drawback is that if the funds are unneeded then
the give back of the unused funds to the industry would in effect
be a subsidy to those companies who joined, as they surely
passed such premiums onto the end consumer. It would, in effect,
be a government bailout for the industry, contrary to what the
industry and Congress has been calling for all along. 296
Insurance Industry Initiative
The United Kingdom's Pool Re is the model for the industry
plan.2 9 7 Privately operated and financed, the fund would be called
293 See S. 1743, supra note 267, at §13(b) (stating "the secretary shall suspend other
operations of the Fund for new contract years on the close of business on December 31,
2004"); see also Lawson, supra note 285, at 68 (stating that the Senate plan would expire
at the end of 2004). See generally Hoffmann & Zolkos, supra note 251, at 1 (stating that
the House version would also end at the closing of 2004).
294 See Stempel, supra note 64, at 868 (stating that the Senate version copies the
British approach taken in response to IRA bombings); see also Rizzo, supra note 288, at
13 (comparing the US plan to the Pool Re plan). See generally Bice, supra note 64, at 448-
454 (discussing the structure of the British system).
295 See S. 1743, supra note 267, at § 13(d) (proving that the Fund is only a temporary
solution); see also Joseph B. Treaster, Threats and Responses: Liability; Senate Passes
Bill Limiting Insurers' Liability After an Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2002, at A15
(noting that final passage allowed for three year government involvement); Joseph B.
Treaster, Senate Takes Up Terrorism Insurance Again, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2002, at Cl
(reporting that Senate proposes a plan to last one year with an option to extend for
another with Treasury Department approval).
296 See Joseph B. Treaster, A National Challenged: The Liability; Insurance
Companies Favor a Plan to Limit Terrorism Losses, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2002, at B5
(pointing out that Senate plan has gained insurer support since it set limits on their
possible losses); see also Joseph B. Treaster, Insurance; Quick Passage of Terrorism Bill,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2002, at C6 (reporting that passage of Senate-backed Bill would
ensure government payment of most damages from terrorist attacks). See generally
Treaster, supra note 299, at A15 (noting final passage of Bill requires government rather
than insurers to pay the majority of losses due to terrorist attacks).
297 See National Association of Professional Surplus Lines Offices, Ltd., Legislative
Report September 11 Attacks Spur Legislation, available atwww.napslo.org/content/
news/newsleter/archive/200/legupdtl1l.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2002) (hereinafter
"NAPSLO") (stating that Homeland is modeled after Pool Re) ; see Alice Schroederet al.,
Insurance-Property-Casualty: Update on WTC-Related Issues, at 6, Morgan Stanley, Oct.
10, 2001 (hereinafter "Morgan Stanley") (describing the United Kingdom's Pool Re plan).
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the Homeland Security Mutual Reinsurance Company or
"Homeland" for short.298 The Homeland Security title was
probably meant to resonate well with Americans and the
Congress, in particular, due to the newly formed agency of the
same name.
The plan was a non-profit mutual insurance company.2 99
Illinois would be the domicile of the company, and therefore the
laws of that state would govern its operation.300 A Treasury
Department representative would be on the company board.301
Further, the Treasury Secretary would appoint a CEO of the
interim board.302
The plan would define terror and the terms of its coverage. 303 It
would be separated along the normal divisions in the industry,
namely personal lines and commercial lines. 304  Insurer
participation in the program would be completely voluntary;305
See generallyBice, supra note 64, at 441-45 (describing the formation of Pool Re).
298 See Steven Brostoff, Insurers Reach Consensus on Terrorism Reinsurance, NAT'L
UNDERWRITER, PROP. & CASuALTY/ RISK & BENEFITS MGMT. EDITION, at 5 (Oct. 15, 2001)
(identifying the insurance industry proposal name); see also NAPSLO, supra note 297, at
3 (providing the name of insurance industry's proposal). See generally Heidi A. Lawson,
Overview of Proposed Federal Initiatives For Terrorism Insurance, available at
http://www.whitecase.com/article terrorism-insurance-heidi-lawson-html (last visited
Jan. 18, 2003) (stating the name of insurance industry proposal).
299 See Mark A. Hoffmann, Industry Unites on Pool Plan; But Groups Face Difficulty
in Securing Federal Legislation, BUS. INS., at 1 (Oct. 15, 2001) (describing goals of
Homeland, leaving absent profit motivations); see also NAPSLO, supra note 297, at 3
(specifying Homeland's not-for-profit status). See generally Lawson, supra note 298
(clarifying that Homeland is a not-for-profit insurance company).
300 See Brostoff, supra, note 298, at 5 (specifying that the industry proposed a state-
chartered company); see also NAPSLO, supra note 297, at 3 (noting Homeland's state of
domicile). See generally Lawson, supra note 298 (highlighting that Homeland is to be
chartered in Illinois).
301 See Morgan Stanley, supra note 297, at 6 (explaining the oversight mechanism
for the reinsurance pool); see also Lawson, supra note 298 (specifying Treasury
Department roles with respect to Homeland). See generally Kendall, supra note 50, at 583
(noting that the insurance industry's proposed a federally-managed reinsurance pool).
302 See Morgan Stanley, supra note 297, at 6 (discussing board appointments for the
reinsurance pool); see also Lawson, supra note 298 (noting further that the Treasury
Secretary is required to asses the type of each loss). See generally Kendall, supra note 50,
at 583 (highlighting that Homeland is to be federally managed).
303 See Brostoff, supra, note 298, at 5 (pointing out that Homeland would create a
uniform definition of "terrorism" for all insurance polices within the U.S.); see also
Morgan Stanley, supra note 297, at 6 (explaining the goals of the plan). See generally
Lawson, supra note 298 (providing Homeland's definition of "act of terrorism").
304 See Brostoff, supra, note 298, at 5 (highlighting the way in which Homeland
would provide reinsurance through two separate lines of commercial and personal risks);
see also NAPSLO, supra note 297, at 3 (describing Homeland's segmentation). See
generally Lawson, supra note 298 (noting that insurance industry proposal would operate
through two financially separate divisions).
305 See Brostoff, supra, note 298, at 5 (stating that participation in Homeland is
voluntary); see also Morgan Stanley, supra note 297, at 6 (discussing the voluntary
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however, any participant would have to place all applicable lines
with the company so as to avoid the companies picking and
choosing what inherently risky policies it desired the pool to
reinsure.306 The plan would sell terror reinsurance to the primary
insurers, and negotiations between the parties would determine
the amount of risk shared between the pool and the primary
insurer.3 07 The financing of the pool would arise from the
premiums and fees charged to primary insurers. 308 Actuarial
techniques would be used to set the pool's reinsurance prices. 309
The Treasury Secretary would establish regulations for the
procurement of underwriting guidelines to cover the terms and
value of such risk.310 The pool would be able to obtain its own
terrorism reinsurance from the Federal Government.311 The
government's responsibility would arise when the pool's surplus
nature of the plan). See generally Lawson, supra note 298 (listing possible members of
Homeland).
306 See Brostoff, supra, note 298, at 5 (noting that once becoming a member an
insurer must place all lines into the pool); see also NAPSLO, supra note 297, at 3 (noting
membership qualification of placing all lines of business with Homeland). See generally
Lawson, supra note 298 (noting that Homeland applies to both personal and commercial
lines of risk).
307 See Brostoff, supra, note 298, at 5 (outlining that members would retain 5% of
risks and Homeland would assume 95% of risks); see also Morgan Stanley, supra note
297, at 6 (discussing risk retention rates). See generally Lawson, supra note 298
(describing risk retention rates among member companies, government and re-insurers).
308 See Morgan Stanley, supra note 297, at 6 (explaining the financing of the pool);
see also CNA Resource Center - Insurance Law Newsletter, WTC Update (Oct. 19, 2001)
(explaining that premiums attributable to terrorism would be paid into Homeland). See
generally Lawson, supra note 298 (implying that member companies' would provide
financing through risk retention).
309 See Morgan Stanley, supra note 297, at 6 (explaining the techniques that would
be used to set the prices for reinsurance); see also Kyle D. Logue, Toward a Tax-Based
Explanation of the Liability Insurance Crisis, 82 VA. L. REV. 895, 914 (1996) (stating that
actuarial techniques involve various statistical techniques to produce estimates of the
total future loss payments attributable to outstanding insurance policies). See generally
H. Miriam Farber, Subterfuge: Do Coverage Limitations and Exclusions in Employer-
Provided Health Care Plans Violate the Americans with Disabilities Act 69 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 850, 866 (1994) (explaining risk classification).
310 See Morgan Stanley, supra note 297, at 6 (discussing the methods to be used to
establish regulations in order to establish proper guidelines); see also Eugene R.
Anderson et al., A.B.A. Manual for Complex Insurance Coverage Litigation: A
Prescription for Insurance Nullification, 7 FORDHAM ENV'rL. L.J. 55, 64 (1995) (stating
that underwriting techniques are used to reflect the risk that an insurer attaches to a
policyholder). See generally Katy Chi-Wen Li, The Private Insurance Industry's Tactics
Against Suspected Homosexuals: Redlining Based on Occupation, Residence and Marital
Status, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 477, 484 (1996) (explaining a use of underwriting techniques).
311 See Morgan Stanley, supra note 297, at 6 (positing the ways the pool would be
able to obtain reinsurance from the government); see also Kendall, supra note 50, at 583
(stating the insurance industry wanted a system modeled after Pool Re). See generally
Robert M. Hall, Security Devises For Unlicensed Reinsurers, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 41,
41 (1995) (defining reinsurance).
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funds slip below the amount reflecting 20% of the surplus that
was in the pool's possession the previous year. 312 Furthermore,
the Treasury Department would be the sole overseer of the
pool. 313 Moreover, in furtherance of the pool's independence, its
assets would not be taxed on either the federal or the state
level.314 Nor would the pool pay premiums315 in the beginning,
despite the fact that in the first two years of the six-year plan the
government would be 100% liable for terrorism losses. 316 The
liabilities of the government under the industry plan are 100%
whenever the reinsurance is payable, the insurers retain none of
the risk.317
As it presently stands, the only way the industry plan would
terminate is when the Treasury Secretary decides that terror is
no longer a viable threat and the private sector is no longer in
312 See Morgan Stanley, supra note 297, at 6 (stating that it would be "activated any
time that the Pool's surplus is reduced to less than 20% of the surplus that existed at then
end of the previous calendar year") (emphasis added); see also Kendall, supra note 50, at
587 (showing that as a result of government responsibilities companies may begin to
reenter the terrorism insurance market). See generally S. Foster, An American Inquiry
into Contemporary Terrorist Accountability, 6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 513, 517 (2002)
(indicating a result of the WTC attacks could be the end of terrorism insurance).
313 See Morgan Stanley, supra note 297, at 7 (explaining the Federal government's
role in the implementation of the pool). See generally Jennifer A. Meyer, Let the Buyer
Beware: Economic Modernization, Insurance Reform, and Consumer Protection in China,
62 FORDHAM L. REV. 2125, 2139 (1994) (showing an effect of government oversight of
insurance). But see Eliot Martin Blake, Rumors of Crisis: Considering the Insurance
Crisis and Tort Reform in an Information Vacuum, 37 EMORY L.J. 401, 430 (1998)
(indicating inherent problems in government oversight of an industry).
314 See Morgan Stanley, supra note 297, at 7 (noting the status of the pool as a non-
taxable entity). See generally Karen A. Clifford & Russel P. Iuculano, AIDS and
Insurance: The Rationale for AIDS-Related Testing, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1806, 1823 (1987)
(providing an example of how much money the insurance industry is responsible for). But
see Mark E. Nance & Bernd Singhof, Banking's Inmuence Over Non-Bank Companies
After Glass-Steagall: A German Universal Comparison, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1305,
1328 (2000) (explaining that the McCarran-Ferguson Act was enacted to grant states
power to tax the insurance industry).
315 See Morgan Stanley, supra note 297, at 7 (showing that the pool would not be
held to pay premiums); see also NAPSLO, supra note 297, at 4 (explaining premiums will
not be paid for retro-cessional reinsurance until a specific point). See generally William
M. Gatesman, Note, Colonial American Life Insurance Co. v. Commissioner: Supreme
Court Disregards Congressional Intent That Indemnity Reinsurance Ceding Commissions
Be Deductible, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 1267, 1268-69 (1990) (explaining how premiums work).
316 See NAPSLO, supra note 297, at 4 (providing that the Treasury would provide for
100 percent of terrorism losses as retro-cessional reinsurance); see also Kendall, supra
note 50, at 586 (explaining proposed plans to help the insurance industry in the event of
terrorism). See generallyAbeyratne, supra note 190, at 605-06 (describing Pool Re).
317 See NAPSLO, supra note 297, at 4 (explaining that the Treasury would be 100%
responsible for the first year of "Homeland"). See generally Abeyratne, supra note 190, at
609-10 (showing a way government can reduce losses in the event of terrorism). But see




need of the federal aid.318
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act: Congressional Compromise
Congress finally reached a conclusion in its attempts to help
the bolster the insurance industry as it wrestled with how to
offer cover for acts of terror and for how much. In the fall of
2002, Congress responded with the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act
of 2002.319 Congress' purpose behind the law was to "protect
consumers" and support the market so that it could stabilize and
find an industry wide method to price the risk of terror.32 0
The period for the new law is January 1, 2003 to December 31,
2005.321 The law establishes the Secretary of the Treasury as the
head of the temporary federal support program. 322 The Secretary
would act in conjunction with the Secretary of State and the
Attorney General in determining whether a covered "act of
terrorism" had occurred. 32 3 Furthermore, the Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act ("TRIA") sets forth a definition of terrorism for the
Secretary to use in determining whether an act of terror has
happened.324 Of profound significance in the definitional area is
318 See Morgan Stanley, supra note 297, at 7 (positing that the industry plan may
never end); see also Patricia A. Long, In the Name of God- Religious Terrorism in the
Millennium an Analysis of Holy Terror, Government Resources, and The Cooperation
Efforts of a Nation to Restrain Its Global Impact, 24 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 51, 66
(2000) (explaining the threat of terrorism). See generally Sara N. Scheideman, Standards
of Proof In Forcible Responses to Terrorism, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 249, 251 (2000)
(indicating a response to terrorism).
319 See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322
(Nov. 26, 2002) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 6701).
320 Id. at § 101(b); see Stephen P. Watters & Joseph S. Lawder, Justice in a Changed
World: The Impact of September 11th on Tort Law and Insurance, 29 Win. Mitchell L.
Rev. 809, 814 (2003) [hereinafter Justice] (outlining certain portions of TRIA).
321 Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 102(11), 116 Stat.
2322 (Nov. 26, 2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6701). The law does state that a
"transitional" period would exist whereby insurers must offer terrorism coverage to
policyholders within ninety days of the enactment of the statute. See id. at § 103(b);
Jackie Spinner, For Firms, an End to a Time of Turmoil. Costs of New Policies Still to be
Worked Ou; WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2002 (declaring TRIA to ease strain for insurance
executives somewhat, but details are enormous).
322 See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 102(1)(A), 116
Stat. 2322 (Nov. 26, 2002) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 6701).
323 See id.
324 See id. "The term 'act of terrorism' means any act that is certified by the Secretary,
in concurrence with the Secretary of State, and the Attorney General of the United
States-
(i) to be an act of terrorism;
(ii) to be a violent act or an act that is dangerous to--
(I) human life;
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the declaration that TRIA will only apply to terrorist events that
emanate from foreign sources. 325 This appears to be of great
interest as native-born terrorist, Timothy McVeigh, perpetrated a
tremendous assault upon the American psyche in the not too
distant past.326 The Federal Government was responsible for the
losses in that instance because it was federal property,
however,327 TRIA would not cover losses caused by acts similar to
McVeigh's.
Additionally, TRIA keeps the insurance industry involved
while it learns how to price terror.328 TRIA accomplishes this by
giving the insurers deductibles that vary during the three years
of the Acts existence. 329 The deductible increases for each year of
(II) property; or
(III) infrastructure;
(iii) to have resulted in damage within the United States, or outside of the
United States in the case of--
(I) an air carrier or vessel described in paragraph (5)(B); or
(II) the premises of a United States mission; and
(iv) to have been committed by an individual or individuals acting on
behalf of any foreign person or foreign interest, as part of an effort to
coerce the civilian population of the United States or to influence the
policy or affect the conduct of the United States Government by
coercion.
Id.
325 See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 102(1)(A)(iv), 116
Stat. 2322 (Nov. 26, 2002) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 6701); see also Steven Plitt,
The Changing Face of Global Terrorism and a New Look of War. An Analysis of the War-
Risk Exclusion in the Wake of the Anniversary of September 11, and Beyond, 39
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 31, 90 (2003) (stating "a covered terrorist act must take place within
the United States.").
326 See Michael R. Belknap, A Putrid Pedigree: The Bush Administration's Military
Tribunals in Historical Perspective, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 433, 437 (2002) (noting civil
tribunals tried "domestic terrorist" McVeigh rather than military courts); David Kaye &
Steven A. Solomon, Current Developments: The Second Review Conference of the 1980
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 922, 926 n.27 (2002)
(alleging McVeigh sought title of "privileged combatant" or a person who has "limited
license to take human life and cause destruction," whereby "prisoner-of-war status" would
attach rather than terrorist outlaw); see also William C. Banks & M.E. Bowman,
Executive Authority for National Security Surveillance, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 94 (2000)
(seeking to determine if the World Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombings were
terrorist acts that could have been averted with diligent surveillance).
327 See Bill Henson, Insurers Await a Flood of Disaster Loss Claims, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH (Ohio), Apr. 23, 1995, at llA, (stating all federal buildings are self-insured); see
also Banks, supra note 326, at 94 (depicting terrorists as not needing modern technology
to cause tremendous destruction as shown in attack on federal building in 1995); Kaye,
supra note 326, at 926 n.27 (describing McVeigh's bombing of Murrah Federal Building).
328 See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act § 101(a)(1)-(5); see also Justice, supra note 320,
at 814 (stating Congress agreed to "partially cover costs" incurred by acts of terror during
the three-year period).
329 See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act § 102(7). Therein also included is a provision for
newly formed insurers who have entered the terror field within the previous year. Id. at §
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the program as it keeps with the purpose of the Act, which was to
allow the insurance industry to respond to the crisis internally
and develop a private market for terror coverage. 330
Acts of terror are to be determined exclusively by the Treasury
Secretary after consultation with the Secretary of State and the
U.S. Attorney General. 331 In so acting, the Secretary may not
give that task to another regardless if the person acts under his
direct supervision. 332 Additionally, the determination is not
subject to attack in the courts. 333 If litigation does arise regarding
the damages incurred by a terrorist attack, TRIA establishes the
ability for one federal district court to be chosen as sole body to
hear such disputes. 334 The law used in that district court is the
law of the State where the terrorist attack took place.335 TRIA
makes the acquisition of personal jurisdiction unproblematic for
the parties before this selected tribunal by making that
particular court "be deemed to sit in all judicial districts in the
United States."336
The amount of federal "skin" involved is ninety percent of the
amount of insured loss that surpasses the deductible of the
particular insurer.337 The industry has been given an aggregate
amount of losses that it is expected to cover before the act comes
into play.338 The industry's retention level increases with each
year of the program, which is once again reflective of TRIA's
overall purpose - to allow the insurance industry to develop a
102(7)(E).
330 See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act § 102(7); see also Vivian Schlesinger, Insurance
Lifeline for Port Authorities: Terrorism Insurance Program Offers Coverage, But It's Not
a Panacea, J. COM., Dec. 16, 2002, at 1, available at LEXIS, News Library (detailing
increased levels of industry exposure as program moved on in years); Plitt, supra note
325, at 89 (interpreting TRIA as measure allowing insurance industry to respond to
reinsurance crisis while maintaining current oversights).
331 See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 § 102(1(A).
332 See id. at § 102(1)(D).
333 Id. at § 102(1)(C). The statute clearly and unequivocally states that all
determinations are final. It would appear to be a level of appeasement to republicans who
were staunchly against the Act without any manner of tort reform within its pages,
particularly a restriction on punitive damages.
334 Id. at § 107(4).
335 Id. at § 107(3).
336 Terrorism Risk Insurance Act § 107(4).
337 Id. at § 103(e)(1)(A); see Insuring Terrorism Risks: Panel I era Hearing Before the
Sen. Commerce, Science & Transp. Comm., 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Sen. Boll
Nelson, D-FL) (describing the effects of the Senate bill).
338 See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act § 103(e)(6).
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private market for terrorism coverage. 339 The program has a one
hundred billion dollar cap on the amount of losses it covers and if
an incident causes such magnitude occurs the Secretary will
notify Congress.340
Lastly, TRIA allows the government to recoup some of the
money it may have to expend during the Act's three-year
lifespan. 34 1 Insurers will have to collect a terror premium from
their insureds upon the direction of the Secretary if the
government must pay out on claims. 34 2
CONCLUSION
The idea of the Federal Government as the insurer of last
resort has finally come to be reality in the realm of terrorism
insurance. Terror coverage, was once taken for granted, is now
viewed as the proverbial seven hundred pound gorilla upon the
back of the industry and its consumers. It is difficult to price and
exorbitant in its final costs. The only way to allow the economy to
go on with any sense of normalcy is for the government to
intervene. The question to this point had been: How?
Of the two bills from which sprang TRIA, the more reasonable
system was that elaborated in the Senate calling for a
proportional involvement by the government with the greater
amount of reimbursement emanating from the premiums in the
pool, which had been ceded to the government. There were no
fees passed onto the consumer in the House bill; however, it
failed to keep the industry involved by having them put some
"skin" on the line.343 Ultimately, the industry has to be involved
339 See id. at § 103(e)(6)(A) - (C). The level of retention is $10 billion in the first year,
$12.5 billion in the second, and $15 billion in the third and final year; see also Justice,
supra note 320, at 814.
340 See id. at § 103(e)(2) & (3). This would appear very commonsensical since an attack
that caused losses in excess of $100 billion one would think Congress to be very involved
and that it would be necessary for the Federal Government to step in for a loss that would
be twenty times greater than that incurred in Manhattan on September 11; see also
Schlesinger, supra note 330, at 1.
341 See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act § 103(e)(7).
342 See id. at § 103(8)(B).
343 See Insuring Terrorism Risks: Panel I of a Hearing Before the Sen. Commerce,
Science & Transp. Comm., 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Sen. Boll Nelson, D-FL)
(describing the effects of the bill). See generally Kendall, supra note 50, at 585-86
(showing the insurance industry wants protection). But see Jeffrey Thomas, From the
Journals: Insurance Law Abstracts, 7 CONN. INS. L.J. 665, 670 (2001) (stating that the
insurance industry itself can be helpful in the fight against terrorism through their
assessments).
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so to be able to take advantage of its expertise, while allowing
them to cede some, if not all, of the risk involved with terrorism
coverage. 344 TRIA accomplished this by having deductibles apply
to both the individual insurers as well as the industry as a whole.
Industry capital must be at stake so that the program does not
become another bailout for a thriving industry that does not need
such all-encompassing help. 345
As has been shown above the solution lies in a partnership
between the government and the insurance industry. The
private sector cannot and will not bear the risk unto itself;
however, the industry is resilient and given time will adequately
develop pricing mechanisms to satisfy the demand without
inflicting harm on the economies of the world. How long before it
efficiently prices such occurrences is still questionable. The
duration of TRIA is set to facilitate the short term, but
considering the temporal manner in which terror occurs it is
unlikely that its three-year period is adequate. It took eight
years between attacks on the World Trade Center and now that
the world is put on alert by the occurrences of September 11, it is
likely that another attempt of that magnitude will take as long if
not longer to occur. Such a long-term threat may lead to the
establishment of pools along the lines of Pool Re in England or
Consorcio in Spain. These pools may have some governmental
involvement, but most likely, they will spring from the private
sector.
Lastly, TRIA appears to be a workable yet imperfect
compromise between the competing interests that barraged
Congress. However, it appears that consumer/taxpayers are still
on the hook no matter what proportion of risk is taken on by
344 See Insuring Terrorism Risks: Panel I of a Hearing Before the Sen. Commerce,
Science & Transp. Comm., 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Paul O'Neill, Sec. of the
Treasury) (affirming the need for industry involvement); see also Gene Rappe, The Role of
Insurance in the Battle Against Terrorism, 12 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 351, 355 (2000) (stating
that insurance industry experts will be used to form plans to help themselves). But see
Kendall, supra note 50, at 569-70 (explaining that the risks are incalculable).
345 See Insuring Terrorism Risks: Panel I of a Hearing Before the Sen. Commerce,
Science & Transp. Comm., 107th Cong. (2001) (question put forth by Sen. Fritz Hollings,
D-SC) (implying and discussing the robust nature of the industry as capital comes
flooding in to take advantage of the hardening (price raising) market); see also William K.
Jones, Confiscation: A Rationale of the Law of Takings, 24 HoFSTRA L. REV. 1, 6 (1995)
(arguing that there is a thriving insurance industry). See generally Kimberly M. Inman,
The Mutual Holding Company: A New Opportunity for Mutual Insurance Companies, 42
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 667, 696 (1998) (indicating that other members of the insurance
industry thrive).
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either the government or the insurance industry. The consumer
will be hit twice - once for rate hikes in their base premiums and
again, as taxpayer, if the program has to swing into action
because of an attack on American soil. Insurance is the
spreading of risk for the few among the many and that appears
to be very true in TRIA, the few are the insurance companies and
the many are the insurance consumers clothed as taxpayers.
Whether it pans out to be corporate welfare or economic necessity
is yet to be seen.
